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ABSTRACT
Over the past several years a new trend has emerged in the low and moderate
housing development field. Throughout the United States local goverments
and community development corporations are developing below- market
homeownership programs- programs in which families between 80 and 120% of
an area's median income can purchase a house for less than the market
price. In many instances this housing is being produced by private
developers through inclusionary zoning programs which require a developer
to make some percentage of his/her units affordable to families within
certain income brackets.
This attempt to integrate homeownership into an affordable housing
program raises a series of issues. One that has received little attention
is resale restrictions. Under the American system of homeownership, a
house is both a commodity and shelter. Therefore without restrictions on
resale prices, units created under a below-market program will inflate to
market prices upon resale. The result is both the loss of the public
subsidy which went into creating the unit and the loss of the affordable
unit itself. If a community's goal is to create a stock of housing which
will remain affordable in the future or to insure a return on its
investment, it must remove the unit from the private market's pricing
system and replace it with an alternative pricing mechanism.
This thesis is an examination of resale restrictions. Its purpose is
to establish how communities around the country are approaching the issue
and to develop a set of criteria and issues which need to be addressed when
designing a restriction. The thesis is divided into five chapters. The
first chapter discusses the goals behind adopting resale restrictions and
the types of restrictions used by 13 communities throughout the country.
The second chapter examines the ideological underpinnings of this issue.
The third chapter addresses issues internal to the design of a restriction.
Four different resale formulas are compared to determine what rates of
return they yield and how well each maintains the affordability of the
house over time. Administrative issues are explored in chapter four. The
final chapter analyzes potential legal lending and marketing problems.
The major finding of the thesis is that while many communities have
adopted resale restrictions, most have instituted resale formulas which do
not guarantee the long term affordability of the below-market unit. In
some cases this has been an intentional policy choice but in many it is a
technical oversight. Two less utilized formulas are analyzed and found to
provide greater long term affordability and administrability. The thesis
therefore concludes that with careful forethought resale restrictions can
be implemented to assure that below-market homeownership programs serve
both current and future moderate-income families.
Thesis Supervisor: Phillip L. Clay
Title: Associate Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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It is possible to alter the pattern of ownership through the intervention
of the state without changing the rules, procedures, or prerogatives of the
tenure system itself. Distributionist reform is especially problematic in
this regard. Parceling out large estates, while leaving intact a private,
market-based system of land tenure, leaves open the possibility that what
is owned today by a multitude of small, low-income producers may be owned
tomorrow- because of sale, foreclosure, or unpaid taxes- by an exclusive
coterie of wealthy individuals and corporations.
John Davis (1980 p.211)
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CHAPTER ONE: An Overview of Resale Restrictions
Anything other than the single family detached house represents a
compromise with the American ideal of freedom.
Constance Perin (1977 p.90)
Introduction
The promotion of homeownership has been an integral part of American
policy since 1785 when Thomas Jefferson designed the National Survey. The
survey, a system of land allotment based on a grid which was infinitely
divisible into square sections, was designed to promote the establishment
of individual homesteads as the country expanded. While efforts to
encourage homeownership continued throughout the 1700s and 1800s, it was
not until the 1930s under Franklin Delano Roosevelt that homeownership
became an explicit national goal.
Throughout the 1940s and 1950s the federal government played a
critical role in promoting homeownership through a plethora of programs.
The establishment of the Federal Home Loan Bank system, the Federal Farm
Mortgage Corporation, Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) and
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC) were essential in creating a
"homeownership infrastructure". Home mortgage programs such as the
Veterans Administration loan program and the Federal Housing Admiistration
loan program along with advantageous tax policies were essential in helping
make homeownership affordable. As Nathan Glazer states in his analysis of
American housing policy:
...it is the single-family, owner-occupied home--getting it built,
getting'it financed, saving it from the banks, reducing its cost, and
increasing its amenities -- that has received the chief attention of
elected officials, administrators, and, one supects, the American
people.(1980,p.431)
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Beginning in the late 1970s the fervor for promoting homeownership
began to develop at not only the traditional federal level but perhaps even
more so at the state and local level. Although local governments have
indirectly promoted homeownership as a model of housing through restrictive
land use policy since Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty (272 U.S. 365,
1926), the direct promotion of homeownership by localities appears to be a
new phonomenon.
This increased role is the result of several factors. Throughout the
1980s the federal government has drastically reduced funds for all
subsidized housing programs. While homeownership is still heavily
subsidized in the form of an approximately $30 billion tax expenditure for
the deduction of interest on mortgages, even this has not gone by without
scrutiny.(Congressional Budget Office,1981,p.6) Concurrent with the
reduction in federal assistance has been a tremendous increase in interest
rates, land costs and inflation. Together these changes have made
homeownership a fleeting possibility for both low and moderate income
families.
An equally important incentive to municipalities' promotion of
affordable housing is increased intervention by state government. In a few
states, years of exclusionary zoning practices have led to state courts and
legislatures requiring localities to make provisions for the accommodation
of moderate-income families. Taken together with the growing need for
affordable housing, this pressure has led municipalities throughout the
U.S. to establish what can be generally classified as below-market
homeownership creation programs.
Under such programs a municipality in conjunction with a private
developer or non-profit agency develops housing and sells it to families at
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a below-market price. Most programs strive to be affordable to families
with incomes between 80 and 120% of the area's median income. What
differentiates these programs from locally administered housing programs is
not that they are necessarily independent of federal and state housing
programs but that the locality contributes some type of subsidy. This may
be a direct contribution, such as a land write-down or a vacant public
building, or an indirect subsidy such as an increase in the allowable
density in exchange for making a percent of the units affordable. Many
programs have recently been instituted under the second category under a
policy known as inclusionary zoning. Inclusionary zoning requires
developers to produce below-market units as part of the zoning regulation
process.
Because homeownership in the United States is part of a private,
market-based system, providing affordable housing through ownership is
quite complicated. There are four major benefits to owning a home in the
U.S. First, ownership provides a family with a stable and secure
residence. Second, ownership gives families access to certain tax
benefits. The most important of these is the deductability of mortgage
interest and property taxes, two of the major expenses associated with
ownership. In addition, any capital gain realized on the sale of a home is
deferred (and eventually waived) if the gain is reinvested in another house
of equal or greater value. Third, because most owners finance the purchase
of a home with long term, fixed rate mortgages, ownership provides a hedge
against inflation. Finally, ownership gives a family an interest in a
major commodity. To the extent that a house appreciates in value over
time, the owner makes a profit on his/her investment.
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The fact that housing is both a commodity and shelter presents a
specific problem for communities creating below-market housing. Put
simply, a community's goal to maintain the unit as affordable housing in
the long term conflicts with the owner's ability to use the property to
generate a profit. Therefore, an important issue which arises in
developing or administering a below-market homeownership program is what
restrictions, if any, should be placed on the transfer of below-market
units. Should families be required to retain the unit for any specific
amount of time? Should they be required to occupy the house or can they
sublet it? Should the unit be part of a long term stock of affordable
housing and therefore restrictions placed on the resale of the house or
should the individual be allowed to reap the profits from appreciation?
Finally, if the family is allowed to reap the profits, should they have to
share these profits with the community? As more and more communities
become involved in the development of below-market equity housing these
issues will play a vital part in the design and administration of programs.
Why Restrictions
When I chose to research this topic, I assumed that many if not most
towns did not address the issue of use and resale restrictions in their
below-market homeownership programs. This was based both on a feeling that
many towns would not have thought about the issue and that those that did
would have rejected the idea for ideological reasons. After reviewing the
literature on inclusionary housing programs and surveying 13 below-market
programs nationally, it is clear that at least in the subset of programs I
examined, resale restrictions are often applied. Specifically, 12 of the 13
programs applied some type of restriction and 10 of the 13 restricted
resale in some way.(See Table I)
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In some localities restrictions were instituted in hindsight. For
example, the town of Lexington, Massachusetts has established a moderate
income ownership program which centers mainly on converting vacant school
buildings into moderate income condominiums. Initially the town set no
income guidelines and established no restrictions on occupancy or resale.
However, after seeing many of the units bought by investors and quickly
sold at market prices, the town decided to implement a series of
restrictions including a limit on the resale price and a screening program
for applicants.(Bowyer Interview)
In other communities restrictions appear to be the result of a state
legislative or court mandated decision. For example, California state law
requires municipalities to make provisions to maintain the long term
affordability of any units created with public funds.(California Gov. Code
65916) In Orange County, California resale restrictions are placed on all
such housing but not on units produced under its inclusionary housing
program without direct public assistance.
In general, the arguments in support of adopting some type of resale
restriction can be summarized in three main points. First is the concern
that a below-market unit does not simply provide a windfall profit to a
single individual. This concern stems primarily from a desire to keep out
speculators. Second and closely related, many communities want to maximize
their public resources. Without some sort of restriction, public
resources will flow to a small group of people without the town regaining
any of its revenue. Davis states this argument succinctly:
When a public subsidy goes into a property to improve its condition or
increase its affordability for low- and moderate-income families, the
subsidy should remain with the property. Otherwise, the subsidy must be
repeated again and again- at increasing amounts- each time the property
is sold. This has been the flaw in many housing and community
development programs of the past. (198 4 ,p.226)
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Finally, many localities want to assure that the housing being created
remains affordable to futue low and moderate income families. Without a
restriction, the housing developed under the below-market housing program
will upon resale be sold at market prices and therefore the units will be
lost when the first generation of occupants move out.
Types of Restrictions
Restrictions take a variety of forms. Some communities use one
particular type of restriction while others combine different types. The
first type of restriction is an occupancy requirement. One approach is to
require owner occupancy for a limited period of time usually between one
and five years. For example, Irvine, California requires participants to
reside in the house purchased for a minimum of one year. While this type
of restriction discourages speculation, it does not maximize the public's
investment or provide for the long term affordability of the unit. The
public subsidy is gradually converted into a private individual's gain and,
upon resale, the unit will inflate to market value leaving the city minus
both its full subsidy and an affordable unit.
A second type of resale restriction is a shared equity restriction.
Under this approach the city takes a percentage of the owner's profits at
the time of resale. This amount may be adjusted downward according to the
term of occupancy thereby rewarding individuals' for the longer they reside
in the house or may be a fixed percentage of the profits from resale. This
model is used in San Francisco's "Moderate Income ILomeownership Opportunity
Program".' During the first seven years of ownership the city reserves the
right of first refusal option; if the owner sells the house, the city has
the right to purchase it for a specified, below-market price. However,
after seven years the owner is free to sell the house at market value but
must share the appraciation with the city.
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Shared equity restrictions not only discourage speculation but also
assure that the municipality gets some kind of return on its money.
However, this approach does not address the concern of maintaining a stock
of affordable housing for the future. There is no guarantee that the
city's return will be sufficient to produce a comprable unit or that such a
unit will be available on the private market at the time of resale
(Mallach,1984 p.157).
The type of resale restriction most often used by the thirteen
municipalities I surveyed is a limited equity provision. Ten out of the 13
programs use some type of limited equity model. Such provisions have
traditionally been associated with alternative tenure models such as
community land trusts and housing cooperatives. Under these models, an
owner's resale price is based on the original purchase price multiplied by
some economic index. Similar to the San Francisco program's operation in
the first seven years, these restrictions give cities the right to purchase
a unit for the fixed price upon resale. The city can assign this right to
purchase to a qualified buyer who meets an income eligibility test.
Formulas to determine the resale price vary widely. The most common
ones are based on the original purchase price adjusted by some inflation
factor. This factor varies but typically is tied to the percentage
increase in the consumer price index or to the percentage increase in
median income. In addition, some of these formulas are tied to regional
increases while others depend on county changes.
Along with the adjustment for inflation most restrictions also allow
adjustments for any substantial improvements. In many cases these
improvements must have received the approval of the administering agency
before construction. Some formulas also adjust for any damages to the
property, closing costs and administration costs.
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Another factor which varies from place to place is the term of the
city's option to purchase the unit at a restricted price. In some
communities, such as Montgomery County, Maryland, this provision is
applicable for as little as ten years. In others, such as Marin County,
California it is "in perpetuity". Most terms ranged from between 30 and 60
years.
In conjunction with applying limited equity provisions, many
communites impose use restrictions. Some communities explicitly require
that the owner occupy the unit. Others require city approval for
subletting. Without such provisions it is easy to imagine that owners
might sublet at market rates to dodge the limited return provision. The
purpose of including these restrictions is to avoid this behavior.
Limited equity provisions strive to achieve the goals behind resale
restrictions in several ways. First, by regulating the rate of
appreciation, such provisions discourage use of the units for speculation.
Second, by limiting the potential resale price limited equity restrictions
protect the public subsidy from being transfered into a windfall profit for
a small set of individuals, the original owners. Instead, the subsidy is
"locked-in" to the unit allowing future low and moderate income homeowners
to benefit from the initial public input and therefore better leveraging
the public's dollar. Finally, by divorcing a unit's price from the market
value, limited equity provisions attempt to maintain these units as long
term affordable housing.
As such it appears that limited equity provisions best achieve the
three stated goals of resale restrictions: prevention of windfall profits,
maximization of public subsidies and maintenance of a stock of affordable
housing. However, before choosing a limited equity provision as a resale
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restriction it is important to look at them more closely. In their article
"The Design of a Housing Allowance," de Leeuw et al suggest that "the
choice of an effective program design from all the possible sets of
provisions should depend on at least three sets of considerations...first
of all on the goals of the program...secondly, on how the housing market
works.. .and finally on how administrative processes work." (1970 p.2) The
rest of this paper focuses on such an exploration. Specifically, what
arguments have been made against the adoption of limited equity
restrictions? How well do such restrictions in practice achieve the stated
goals of the programs? And, what legal, financial and administrative
issues do the use of these restrictions raise?
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CHAPTER TWO: The Debate
Once we do this (accept resale controls), God knows what will happen.
This is a very dangerous precedent and I am going to fight it as far as I
can. It's time for all to stand tall or we might as well live in Russia.
Unidentified Secondary Mortgage Market Official
as Quoted by The Los Angeles Times
Inherent in limited equity restrictions is an alternative notion of
ownership. In the United States property ownership has traditionally
included the right to determine its use and value. As Davis states:
Land and housing in the United States are legally treated as commodities
freely traded at the highest price agreeable to both buyers and sellers.
The value inherent in a parcel of property minus outstanding liens and
liabilities belongs to the person who holds the deed.
(1984 p.223)
Consequently, homeownership in the U.S. is not only a means of providing
shelter for oneself but, when the market allows, an investment.
Limited equity provisions challenge the right of owners to reap
undivided, unlimited profits from the disposal of their property. In doing
so they fali into a concept of ownership first promulgated in the United
States by Henry George. George believed that land values are the creation
of both an individual and society's input. A property's value is in part
the creation of the owner's capital and labor and in part a "gratuitous
windfall bestowed by changes in the larger society." (Davis,1984 p.209)
Whereas capitalist models of ownership believe that both kinds of value
belong to the individual owner, George believed that owners have an
absolute right to the fruits of their own labor but no rights to the value
created by others be they public or private. (Davis,1984 p.21 4 ) Georgeist
models therefore strive to differentiate the individual's investment from
the community's and to distribute the profits accordingly.
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Given that limited equity provisions challenge the dominant notion of
ownership in the United States, it is not surprising that their
implementation has faced opposition in many communities. In several
communities restrictions have consciously been rejected. In Irvine,
California for example, the only restriction which the town applies is a
one year owner occupy regulation despite the fact that homes originally
sold for $31,500 have since been sold for twice that much.(Strauss and
Stegman,1979 p.21 7 ) In Davis and Orange County, California attempts to
impose limited equity restrictions faced opposition from both town
officials and the real estate industry.(M1allach,1984 p.14 7 )
Arguments against limited equity restrictions can be divided into two
groups: practical objections and ideological objections. Two practical
problems are often identified with resale restrictions. First, resale
restrictions deprive governments of property tax revenues. Specifically,
because property taxes are based on a home's assesed value and resale
restrictions limit this value, taxes collected on restricted homes will be
less than on a comprable market home. As Mallach points out, the overall
impact of this reduction in taxes is negligible and must be evaluated in
relation to the cost of alternative approaches to providing a long term
stock of affordable housing.(1934 p.145)
Opponents also contend that restrictions provide a disincentive for
maintaining property and even encourage stripping the housing of any
valuable assets. Economist William Fischel gives an example of this logic
in a letter to Robert Ellickson:
If the market price of a unit is $100,000 and the controlled price is
$60,000 assume that all housing prices rise in five years by 50%. The
controlled house now can be sold for $90,000 for a tidy tax free gain of
$30,000. But why should the lucky "moderate income" family settle for
only a $30,000 gain? Suppose that ordinary maintenance in the five year
period would have cost $5,000. Forgoing the maintenance causes the house
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to depreciate by $10,000. But what does the controlled price owner care?
All that happens to him is that the true value of the house is now only
$140,000. But since he cannot get more than $90,000, he has no incentive
to maintain the house. In fact, in this situation he has some incentive
to cannibalize the house, selling good features and replacing them with
cheap or no features.(1981 p.209)
As mentioned above, this problem is easily alleviated by allowing for
increases in price for substantial improvements and deducting for damages
in the resale formula.
Two major ideological arguments are at the center of the resale
restriction debate. At the heart of the resistance to adopting resale
restrictions is the belief that resale restrictions represent a fundamental
infringement on property rights. Opponents contend that the restrictions
are an unjustifiable government intervention into an otherwise free market
and interfere with basic property rights, specifically, the right to sell,
the right to sublet and the right to make a profit.
On the one hand, it is difficult to dismiss this argument. As stated
above, limited equity restrictions are indeed a redefinition of rights
entailed in property ownership. Vhereas proponents of no restrictions
argue that the owners of below-market units have the rights to any profits
generated by resale, proponents of limited equity restrictions argue that
owners are only entitled to the equity generated by their personal
investment.
On the other hand, the opposition's contention that restrictions are
an unjustifiable intervention in an otherwise free market is not
supportable. The American housing market hardly contains the neoclassical
characteristics of a free market. As Perin states:
the historical trend to widespread homeownership has come about not
through some natural workings of the market, but only by means of an
artificial set of incentives designed originally to stimulate the economy
by increasing housing production." (1977 p.77 )
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Government intervention takes a multitude of forms. It includes
zoning and building code regulations, tax deductability of mortgage
interest and property taxes, and regulation of the thrift institutions
making investment in housing a prefered option. Therefore what is
different about limited equity restrictions is not that they interfere with
an otherwise free market. Indeed, the below-market homeownership programs
which lead to the resale restrictions opponents dislike are clearly an
example of intervention. What is different about resale restrictions is
that they blantantly interfere with the market and that rather than enhance
the profitability of housing as most government intervention does, limited
equity restrictions seek to constrain profit making.(Mallach,1984 p.148)
In sum, what opponents appear to be responding to is not the provision of
affordable housing which is being created in a way which affirms the
prevailing housing system, but what Achtenberg and Marcuse call the
decommodification of housing-- the fact that limited equity provisions
challenge rather than reinforce the idea of housing as a commodity.
A closely related criticism of resale restrictions is that they in
effect create a group of second class citizens. Opponents believe that
placing restrictions only on those who participate in a below-market
homeownership program while all other homeowners have the freedom to reap
whatever price the market will bear is discriminatory. Such restrictions
place these individuals at a continued disadvantage since they can not
participate in the substantial profits generated from selling the unit and
in turn can not advance their economic status. Whereas the first argument
against restrictions has been raised predominantly by conservative
idealogues, the second is raised by liberal and conservative individuals
alike.
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The second class argument can be challenged on several counts. First
the argument presents a false dichotomy between the "free market" and the
"restricted homeowner". As many proponents of resale restrictions point
out, absent the below-market homeownership program, participants would not
have been able to own a home. The comments of Karen Burns, past
administrator of the below-market homeownership program in Bedminster New
Jersey, are representative of other programs. She notes that most
participants come from a rental housing situation. Therefore, the choice
for the homeowner is not between a limited equity build-up and a market
rate return but rather between a limited return and no return at all.
Secondly, the argument ignores the fact that resale restrictions are
but one of many types of restrictions placed on participants in government
programs. For example, in public development programs the amount of fees
and profit a developer can make is limited. In government contracts,
recepients must agree to pay prevailing wages and practice affirmative
action. Tax credits require recepients to meet special guidelines whether
that means preserving the structure of a building or retrofiting a heating
system. In each example the government is granting its services in
exchange for expected behavior from the recipient. That these requirements
reduce individuals' monetary returns or restrict activity and thereby
interfere with the free market is understood.
Third, the argument that homeownership is and should be a route to
climbing the class ladder is one which lacks a historical perspective.
While homeownership may have meant exceptional profits for persons lucky
enough to have owned in highly inflationary markets (such as California in
the late 1970s or the Boston area today) such dynamics have been the
exception rather than the rule. As Mallach states, "the notion that the
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opportunity to make disproportionate profits on the sale of a home is the
only route to middle class status in America is, simply stated, a bizarre
notion that one imagines is held only by realtors and at that, hardly any
realtors except those in California."(p.146) Furthermore, such profits
have seldomly been an option for a vast number of Americans, namely poor
people, people of color and female headed households all of whom have been
systematically discriminated against in the housing market.
Finally, the second class citizen argument focuses attention almost
exclusively on the investment component of homeownership. Yet some policy
makers argue that "the purpose of the program is not to provide an
investment opportunity, but to provide a home."(Association of Day Area
Governments, 1930 p.8- 4) This statement illuminates many of the issues
underlying the debate over limited equity restrictions. below-market
homeownership programs in and of themselves do not challenge the dominant
concept of housing in the U.S. While some advocates may see such programs
as vehicles to force the private market to provide housing for a wider
range of incomes, others can interpret them as incorporating more people
into the private market, that is helping more people get a piece of the
american pie. The issue of resale restrictions however forces policy
makers and decision makers to come terms with the conflicts embedded in
such programs. Namely is the goal of below-market homeownership program to
produce a stock of longterm affordable housing in which case the
"investment" quality of housino must be subordinated, or is the goal to
spread homeownership in its traditional format to a larger percentage of
the population in which case the goal of providing affordable housing in
the long run must be dismissed.
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CHAPTER THREE: Designing A Restriction
Applying Limited Equity Restrictions: Variations on a Theme
Despite the ideological choices embedded in limited equity
restrictions, a community's choice of such a provision does not necessarily
mean that it shares all of the restriction's ideological implications. As
mentioned above, limited equity provisions have four possible components.
Table I shows how each of the 13 communities examined mix and match these
components in order to achieve different goals. In effect what communities
are doing is striking a compromise between limiting individual's profits
and providing long term affordable housing.
Before looking at specific cases it is helpful to review the four
components. First and most obvious is the formula for calculating the
maximum resale price. It may or may not include allowments for improvments
made on the restricted property. Second and as important is the term --
the period for which the restriction applies. Use requirements obligating
the owner to occupy the unit are the third possible component. The final
component is an income restriction not only on the original owner but also
on the potential buyer.
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TABLE 1: :O]MPAPISFIN OF PESALE PESTPICTION-.
ROJUSTS OWNER OCCUPANCY INCOME TEST
CATEGOPY TYPE OF RESTRICTION TERM F ORMULA FOR IMPS: PEUIRE UPON PESALEPPOGRAM
Davis 1 rOwner Occupancy Req'd 2 n/a Sn/a 2 years
Irvine
Petuluma
Muntgomery County
Bou 1 der
Orange County
San Francisco
Marin County
Palo Alto
Le:.<ington
Bedminster
Princeton
Burl ingtor
0 Owner may rent to
CA 1 Owner Occupancy Req'd 1 n/a
CA 1 None 0 n/a
MD 2 Limited Equity 10 Change i
CO 2 Limited Equity 10 Change i
CA 3 Limited Equity 30 Change i
CA 3 Shared Appreciation n/a Fair Mkt.
CA 4 Limited Equity in perpetuity Change i
CA 4 Limited Equity 60 1/3rd Ch
MR 4 Limited Equity 99 4% Rnnua
NJ 4 Limited Equity 40 Change i
NJ 4 Limited Equity 121 Change i
VT 4 Limited Equity in perpetuity 25% of M
income eligible family with approval of administering agency
1 = No Resale Pestriction
2 = Resale Restriction Applied for Short Period of Time
3 = Resale Pestriction Applied Principally to Recoup Public Investment
4 = Resale Restriction Applied for a Long Term
n CPI
n Median Income
n Median Income
Appreciation x
n Median Income
ange in CPI
1 Increase
n Median Income
n Median Income
arket Appreciati
Avg Loan Balance:
or in CPI
on
r/a
n/a
yes
yes
yes
n/a
yes
yes
no
yes
yes
n/a
1 year
no
yes
yes x
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes x
yes
yes A
yes
-go
yes
yies
yes
yes
yes
Yes
ges
yes
yes
yes
CA
t j
W
Although no two of the thirteen communities I examined use exactly the
same type of restriction, the thirteen can be divided into four general
groups. The first group consists of communities who do not impose any type
of resale restriction much less a limited equity restriction. These
communites may or may not impose owner occupancy requirements. Included
in this category are Davis, California, Irvine, California and Petuluma,
California.
Davis, California's restriction is representative of these three
communities approach. Since 1977 the city has operated an inclusionary
housing program which requires developers to make 33% of the total units
built affordable to families with incomes between 80 and 120% of median
income. The program is part of the city's growth management plan.
Despite the fact that since the program's inception below- market units
have yielded handsome windfall profits for the first time homebuyer and in
turn escalated to the market price and are therefore no longer affordable,
the city council has consistently rejected proposals to impose limited
equity restrictions. The only restriction placed on the below-market units
is a two year owner occupancy requirement. The Council's decision is the
product of both vocal opposition from developers and reluctance to increase
their level of interference in the marketplace.
A second group of communities apply limited equity restrictions but
remove these restrictions after a relatively short period of time. The
major goal of such programs appears to be to prevent speculation and
windfall profits among the first and possibly second generation of
homeowners. Montgomery County, Maryland's restriction represents this
approach. Montgomery County operates a below-market housing program known
as the "Moderately Priced Housing Program". Created in 1973, it requires
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developers of over 50 units to make 12.5 percent of the total homes created
affordable to moderate income families. To date, approximately 3000 units
have been sold through this program.
The Montgomery County program imposes a limited equity formula as well
as an income screening requirement and an owner occupancy regulation on all
its houses. The term on all of the restrictions is ten years. This is an
increase from the original term which was five years. The modification was
made in 1982 in response to the large profits being reaped by the original
homeowners. (Gafney Interview) As in Davis, California, Montgomery County
officials therefore clearly recognized that initial owners were making
large profits and that the prices of these houses were not remaining
affordable to future participants. Yet officials decided that owners who
resided in the units for more than ten years should not be restricted. By
applying restrictions for the first ten years and then removing them, the
county has made a concious trade-off between providing affordable housing
and the individual's "right" to make an unlimited profit.
A third group of communities use limited equity restrictions yet make
the goal of protecting the public's investment their priority. Orange
County, California's restrictions embody this approach. Since 1979 Orange
County has operated an inclusionary housing program which requires that 25%
of the housing in large, new developments be affordable to households with
incomes below 120% of the area's median income. The county encourages
developers to place resale restrictions on all units but only requires them
on units, built with the assistance of public funds. The specific
requirement is that maximum resale price be tied to the purchase price plus
improvements multiplied by the change in median income. In addition, the
owner must occupy the unit and sell to another income eligible family. The
restriction applies for 30 years.
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Orange County's restriction is largely the result of the California
state policy. In contrast to the three California communities who have
chosen not to impose resale restrictions, at the state level officials
decided to require such restrictions on any house produced with direct
public subsidies. Specifically, in 1979, the state legislature passed a
California state statute which requires local governments to assure the
continued availability of any low and moderate income housing built with
"direct financial contributions" for thirty years.(Schwartz and
Johnston,1983 p.6) Direct contributions include write-downs of land costs,
infrastructure expenses or construction costs. In essence, by
distinquishing between units created with direct public benefits and those
created with indirect benefits the legislature's underlying goal appears to
be the maximization of public funds rather than creating a stock of long
term, affordable housing.
The primary goal of the San Francisco Redevelopment Authority's
restriction is also to maximize the public subsidy. However its approach
is to try and do so without limiting the owner's return on investment.
Under their affordable condominuim program housing prices are subject to
limited equity provisions for the first seven years. This maintains the
affordability of the unit in the short term and discourages speculation.
After the seventh year units are allowed to appreciate to their market
value. However, in order to recover a percentage of the public's
investment, the Redevelopment Authority recaptures a share of this
appreciation at the time of resale.
The agency's restriction is part of an extraordinarily complex program
named, "The Shared Appreciation Loan Program". Begun in 1982, this program
works in conjunction with the agency's affordable condominium program.
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Eligible buyers purchase below-market units for a 5% downpayment and the
maximum affordable first mortgage (one in which the principal and interest
payments equal 25% of the family's household income). The city takes a
second mortgage on the property equal to the difference between the
purchase price and the downpayment plus the first mortgage. Take for
example a $100,000 home. Assuming an eligible family can afford a $70,000
first mortgage and a $5,000 downpayment, the city would take a second
mortgage for $25,000.
Payments on the second loan do not begin until the second year of
occupancy and are equal to 4% of the first mortgage's payment. The payments
increase by 4% each year so that in year two the owner's payment equals 8%
of the 1st mortgage, in year three 12% of the first mortgage payment, etc.
All payments on the second loan go towards reducing the principal debt. No
interest is due on the loan until either the principal amount of the second
loan is paid off or until the time of sale, which ever comes first. At
that point the city takes its interest in the form of a share of the unit's
appreciation. The City calculates its share by multiplying the increase in
value by the average outstanding loan balance over the life of the second
mortgage.
Continuing with the same example used above then, say that at the time
of resale the house has appreciated from $100,000 to $150,000 --an increase
of 50%. Assuming that the average outstanding balance over the life of the
second mortgage was $10,000, the city would receive 50% (rate of
appreciation) of $10,000 (average outstanding loan) or $5,000 as its
interest payment on the second mortgage. Should the owner complete all
principal payments on the second mortgage before selling the home, an
appraisal of the home will be conducted and the city's "share of
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appreciation" calculated accordingly. The owner can pay off this interest
on the same 4% system. Therefore in above example, the owner would
continue making payments until he or she had paid an additional $5000.
After this time the city's interest in the property would be eliminated.
Again, the shared appreciation model only comes into play after the
seventh year of ownership. In the first seven years resale is restricted
with a limited equity provision. The maximum resale price is equal to the
sum of the initial downpayment, the amount of the first mortgage and the
total principal payment made on the second loan multiplied by the
percentage increase in the area's median income. Owners are required to
occupy the unit and to sell to another eligible household. Therefore the
San Francisco Redevelopment Authority has adopted the view that resale
should be limited for a brief period of time discouraging speculation and
maintaining affordability. However after this period, an owner should be
able to reap the market's benefits but should share some of those benefits
with the public.
Finally, several communities combine the four components of resale
restrictions in a way which maximizes their ability to decommodify housing.
Included in this forth category are Lexington, Massachusetts, Burlington,
Vermont, Marin County and Palo Alto, California and three communities in
the state of New Jersey. In each of these areas, owners of below-market
units are required to sell at a restricted price, must occupy the unit and
must sell to another low or moderate income family. In addition all of
these restrictions have relatively long terms ranging from 40 years to in
perpetuity.
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The Resale Formula: Choosing A Pricing Mechanism
While communities may differ on when to impose limited equity
restrictions or for how long such restrictions should take effect, all of
these communities must select a formula for calculating resale price. This
is no easy task. Accustomed to planning in a society in which the
"invisible hand" prices housing, policy makers often have little experience
in designing an alternative pricing system.
Four goals may come into play in choosing a formula. These principles
can guide the policy maker in choosing a formula. First, given that a
community has already decided to choose a limited equity restriction,
policy makers will want to design a formula which maintains the purchase
price at an affordable level. Second, policy designers may want to assure
that the owner is able to recoup his/her investment in the house. This can
be interpreted to mean the initial down payment, the equity paid in (down
payment plus principal payments), the purchase price plus substantial
improvements or the purchase price plus improvements plus an inflation
factor. Third, policy makers may want to allow owners to not only recoup
their investment but to make a return on it in order to compensate for the
opportunity cost of investing in housing versus another commodity.
Finally, policy makers will want to consider the feasibility of
administering the formula.
Surprisingly, little research has been conducted on how well different
limited equity formulas actually achieve these goals. The next section of
this paper focuses on four different formulas used by communities in order
to answer two questions: What type of return does the original owner
achieve under each formula?; and How well do these formulas achieve the
goal of maintaining the unit's affordability for other low and moderate
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income families?. The types of administrative problems each formula raises
is addressed in a subsequent section. The goal of this section is not to
recommend a particular formula, as that choice ultimately depends on the
goals of the program. Rather this section identifies the trade-offs
inherent in the different formulas.
Four different formulas are examined. The first formula, change in
median income, calculates the resale price by multiplying the purchase
price by the change in median income from the time of initial purchase to
the time of resale. Median income is based on the Department of Housing
and Urban Development's estimate of median income for any given SMSA. HUD
publishes this information annually. The second formula, change in CPI,
increases the initial purchase price by the percentage increase in the
urban consumer price index as reported by the National Bureau of Labor
Statistics. The third formula, affordability, calculates the resale price
not by increasing the purchase price by any given index, but rather by
determining what price a program eligible family can support given interest
rates at the time of resale. For example, if a unit was originally sold to
a family whose income was 80% of median income, upon resale the family must
sell at a price affordable to a family now at 80% of median income. The
final formula, the Burlington formula, calculates resale price by adding
25% of the unit's appreciation during the period of occupancy to the
original purchase price. Appreciation is determined by requiring an
appraisal at the time of purchase and the time of resale.
Before analyzing the formulas quantitatively it is helpful to look at
each conceptually. Change in CPI is based on the idea that owners should
be able to recoup their investment in real versus current dollars. The
formula quantifies this concept by adjusting the purchase price by the rate
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of increase in the consumer price index over the period of ownership. It
does not explicitly try to address either the issue of return on investment
or long term affordability.
Change in median income also tries to address the issue of an owner
recouping his or her investment by using the purchase price as the basis of
its formula. However unlike the CPI model, it does not explicitly deal
with the potential of the investment being devalued over time due to
inflation. Instead it ties the resale price to changes in median income in
hopes of maintaining affordability. The idea is that purchase price should
increase only to the extent that income increases.
Both the change in CPI model and change in median income model were
adapted from limited equity cooperatives. Yet because cooperatives are
financed differently than traditional equity homes, the use of these
restrictions on non-cooperative houses does not necessarily achieve the
same results. Specifically, whereas non-cooperative housing is financed
with a single mortgage, cooperatives are financed with two loans. The
first loan, a blanket loan, covers most of the financing and is applied for
by the cooperative corporation. The second loan, a share loan, may be
taken out to cover the cost of purchasing a share in the cooperative.
Under traditional homeownership when a house is sold the new buyer
usually takes out a new mortgage and the previous owner repays the original
loan. The exception is when a new buyer assumes the previous buyer's
mortgage. On the other hand, in a cooperative only the share loan turns
over. The primary loan, the blanket loan, remains in place. The new owner
simply assumes the old owner's percent of monthly debt payments.
In order to understand the importance of this difference it is
necesarry to digress to a discussion of what determines affordability.
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Affordability is a product of three different components. First and most
obviously it is a function of a household's income. All other things held
constant, the greater one's income the more one can afford to spend for
housing. Second, affordability is a function of housing costs. In the
case of resale this is translated into the purchase price. Finally, if a
household must borrow money to buy the house, as is usually the case,
affordability is a function of the cost of capital. The higher the
interest rate, the lower the purchase price a family can afford.
In a housing cooperative because the blanket mortgage is not
refinanced at each resale, a formula that ties the price of a share to the
purchase price times the rise in median income or CPI can address both the
issue of recouping an owner's investment and maintaining affordability.
(Of course its success also depends on how well the index used to track
changes in income actually reflects real changes in low-income persons
income. As is discussed later in this chapter, finding an appropriate
index is problematic.) Yet because under traditional homeownership
refinancing usually occurs simultaneously with resale, even if the formula
controls for the price of the unit and the change in income, it does not
necessarily preserve affordability. In order to do so the restriction
would have to incorporate controlling for the change in the cost of
capital.
The affordability model tries to do just that. It determines resale
price based on the new median income and the current interest rate. In
this way it is able to preserve affordability. On the other hand, the
affordability model cannot guarantee that the owner recoups his or her
investment. Interest rates could rise while income falls producing a
resale price below that which the original owner paid.
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The Burlington model takes a different approach. Like the median
income model and the CPI model it bases all resale prices on the initial
purchase price and thereby insures that owner recoups his or her
investment. However, rather than tie this investment to an index of
inflation or affordability, the Burlington model ties the return to a
limited percent of the market's appreciation. Therefore neither
affordability nor return on investment is guaranteed (as will be seen in
later discussion), but because such a low percentage of appreciation is
taken a balance is struck between the two.
Finally, it is useful to compare the above four formulas with the
market's method of pricing housing. While it is obvious that a market
based formula does not guarantee future affordability, it is perhaps less
obvious in these times of volatile inflation that the market also does not
guarantee an owner of recouperating his or her investment. Housing prices
may deflate as well as inflate due to changes in a neighborhood, changes in
consumer taste, or changes in demand. Thus the three formulas which do
insure the owner's return of capital (CPI, median income and Burlington)
provide greater security to the owner than the market.
Recoups and Returns on Investment
In order to compare the internal rate of return produced by the four
limited equity models I developed an investment model which measures the
rate of return on a hypothetical, below-market unit purchased in 1975 and
held for ten years. (All assumptions and their respective sources are
listed in the appendix.) The base model assumes that the owners are a
couple with two children and earn 78% of the median income. The house is
purchased for $32,000 ($12,300 below the market price at the time) with a
5% downpayment and a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage at 9.1%. For simplicity
and clarity, no points or closing costs are assumed.
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The model calculates rate of return in three parts. First, it
estimates the value of the tax benefits accruing from homeownership. The
couple is assumed to file a joint return and to be in the 30% tax bracket.
In addition to deducting mortgage interest and property taxes, the model
assumes that the couple itemizes an additional 5% of their income.
Next, the model calculates the couple's net housing expenses.
Included are mortgage payments, property taxes, insurance, utilities and
repairs and maintenance. (Because of the inclusion of repairs and
maintenance, the model assumes that the house does not depreciate.)
Operating expenses are based on the average monthly expenses for a HUD
Section 203 single family home in 1975 and are inflated at a rate of 7% per
year (the actual annual rate of increase in CPI between 1975 and 1985).
The model then subtracts 9% of the house's original price inflated annually
by 7% from total housing expenses in order to account for the unit's
imputed rental value. The purpose of the imputed rent is to distinguish
that cost which an owner incurs to provide shelter regardless of the
ownership structure from that portion of expense which is incurred as a
result of ownership. The result is an annual estimate of net housing
expenses.
Sales proceeds are calculated based on the resale formula minus the
outstanding mortgage and brokerage fees. All of the expenses and benefits
are finally discounted at 10% in order to calculate the net present value
and internal rate of return.
Table 2 illustrates that had any of the resale formulas been applied
to the hypothetical unit between 1975 and 1985 the owners would have not
only recouped their initial investment in both nominal and real dollars,
but would have also realized rates of return ranging from 11 to 23 %.
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(Because the rate of inflation between 1975 and 1985 was approximately 7%
per year I assume that any formula which produces a return of 7% or more is
protecting an owner's investment in constant dollars regardless of the
actual resale price.) In each case this return is predominately the
outcome of the actual benefits of owning the home versus tax benefits.
This is due to both the relatively small mortgage and marginal income tax
bracket (30%).
TABLE 2
COMPARISON OF IRR ON LIMITED EQUITY MODELS
1975-1985
Formula :Purchase Price;Resale Price Resale Price IRR
(1975 s) (1975 $s) (1985 $s)
Market $32,000 $48,616 $95,133 31.52Z
Change in CPI $32,000 $32,000 $62,618 21.52%
Change in Median Income $32,000 $34,188 $66,900 23.25%
Affordabilty $32,000 1 $28,107 $55,000 17.90%
Burlington $32,000 $22,847 $44,708 11.04%
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Sensitivity analyses (presented in the Appendix Tables A,E,G,J and K)
illustrate the impact changes in maximum resale price would have on the
respective rate of return of each model. Because each model depends on
different variables to determine resale price, each sensitivity table is
slightly different. The purpose of the sensitivity analysis is to show how
vulnerable the rates of return for the four different models are to changes
in their major variables. For example, in the case of the change in CPI
model, what happens to the internal rate of return if there is no change in
CPI? What happens if there is a small increase?, a large increase? Under
the change in median income model, what happens to the internal rate of
return if there is no change in median income? a small change?, a large
change? To evaluate the Burlington model one must consider changes in
rates of appreciation. Finally, to test the sensitivity of the
affordability model both changes in interest rates and changes in income
must be tested. (In order to help the reader keep tract of the different
variables, Table 6 in the appendix lists the actual changes between 1975
and 1985.)
Sensitivity table A suggests that the returns produced by the CPI
formulas are not very sensitive to changes in the rate of inflation. All
other things held constant, under the CPI model an owner would yield less
than a 10% return only if CPI increased by an annual rate of less than 4%.
In such a situation it would make sense for the discount rate to be lowered
given that in the case of below-market homeownership this rate
predominately reflects expected inflation.
Sensitivity table E illustrates that the median income formula behaves
very similarly. In this case, internal rate of return drops below 10% only
when the compounded growth rate in median income goes below 3%. The actual
rate between 1975 and 1985 was 7.65%
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The Burlington and affordabiltiy models are less likely to
consistently allow for a return on investment. The Burlington model, in
so far as it is based on the original purchase price, does insure that the
owner recaptures his or her investment in current dollars. It does not,
however, protect this investment from depreciating due to inflation.
Sensitivity table G illustrates that all other things held constant, the
appraised value of the house must increase from $44,300 to $79,000 (an
annual growth rate of 6%) in order to keep pace with inflation during the
period 1975 to 1985. The national average price in 1985 as reported in the
"Price Index of New One Family Homes" was $95,133 (an annual growth rate of
8%). Intuitively, what this means is that if the rate of appreciation is
less than the rate of inflation, the owner's investment will not be
protected in real dollars. On the other hand, in markets experiencing fast
appreciation, such as Boston today or California in the 1970s, owners stand
to make very high rates of return at a minimal risk.
As demonstrated in sensitivity table J, the affordability model is the
most volatile of the four formulas because of its dependence on current
interest rates. Holding all else constant, the more interest rates
increase the lower the return to the original owner. This dynamic may be
somewhat offset by increases in median income as is the case in the base
model. In this scenario because income was increasing at 7% per year, the
owner earned a 10% return as long as interest stayed within six percentage
points of its original level. However, in periods when interest rates are
rising quickly and income is either stable or increasing slowly, as between
1975 and 1980 ,the original owner's income can be severly constrained.
In sum, from an investment stand point alone the CPI formula is the
best choice as it guarantees a rate of return slightly above inflation due
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to its adjustment for CPI in addition to tax benefits. The median income
and Burlington model guarantee the owner a return as long as income or the
the house respectively are appreciating at a rate slightly greater than
inflation. The affordability model is the most sensitive because of its
heavy reliance on changes in the cost of capital.
Measuring Affordabilty
While CPI and median income formulas provide good returns to the
original owner, they are not necessarily reliable mechanisms for
maintaining the affordabilty of a unit. In order to evaluate the four
formulas impact on affordability I developed a second model which
calculates the income required to purchase a unit at a given price and
interest rate. The model assumes that total monthly housing costs
(mortgage payments, property taxes and insurance) cannot exceed 30% of a
household's total income. Unlike the previous model which is an investment
analysis, this model is a before-tax, cash-flow analysis in order to
simulate a bank's evaluation criteria. Affordability is measured by how
closely the formula maintains the level of income originally required to
purchase the unit. In order to compare across time periods, required
income is expressed as a percent of median income.
Table 3 illustrates the different levels of affordability produced by
the four different formulas. The base case assumes that interest rates
rose nearly 30% between 1975 and 1985) (from 9.1% to 11.8%) and that median
income increased 111% (from $15,300 in 1975 to $32,300 in 1985).
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TABLE 3
COMPARISON OF AFFORDABILTY ON LIMITED EQUITY MODELS
1975-1985
Formula Purchase PriceiResale PriceiResale Price, Affordabilityt
(1975 $s) (1975 is) (1985 $s)
Market $32,000 $48,616 $95,133 78 to 136
Change in CPI $32,000 $32,000 $62,618 78Z to 89%
Change in Median Income! $32,000 $34,188 1 $66,900 1 782 to 95Z
Affordabilty $32,000 $28,107 $55,000 1 781 to 787.
Burlington $32,000 $22,847 $44,708 t78Z to 63Z
tAffordability is defined as a percentage of the median income required to purchase
a house assuming a 30 year fixed rate mortgage with 5Z downpayment and no closing costs
and assuming total monthly hosuing costs cannot exceed 307. of total household income.
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Under the CPI formula, the affordability of the unit decreased over
the ten-year period despite rises in income. Whereas in 1975 a family at
78% of median income could purchase the unit, in 1985 the unit required a
family at 89% of median income. This decrease in affordability is
primarily due to the rise in interest rates. To offset this rise in
interest rates, income would have had to have grown at approximately 9% per
year (as opposed to the actual growth rate of 7.65%). In contrast, had
interest rates remained at 9.1% while income rose at the stated rate, the
unit would have become slightly more affordable (requiring a family at 74%
of median income.) (See sensitivity table D)
The median income model is even more sensitive to changes in the
interest rate (See sensitivity table F). Whereas in 1975 the unit was
affordable to someone at 78% of median income, the same house ten years
later required a person at 95% of median income. Had interest rates
remained at 9.1%, the unit's affordability would have decreased only
slightly requiring a family at 80% of median income versus 78%. Given the
rate of increase in median income throughout the ten year period, (7.65%
annually) affordability would decrease by 2% for every .05% increase in
interest rates.
The problem of maintaining affordability under the change in median
income formula is not only tied to the inability to control interest rates
but also to fluctuations in the median income index. In his study on
restrictions in California, Mallach found that the resale restriction used
in Orange County (change in median income) often produced resale prices
which were greater than the market.
This index (median income as defined by HUD) turned out to be remarkably
volatile in Orange County with an average increase since 1976 of 12.2
percent. Even more seriously, and immediately before the first
substantial number of resales occured, HUD increased the median by 30%
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from 1980 to 1981 as a result of a compensation for discrepancies between
prior estimates and the information available from the 1980 census.
(p.15 3 )
This "adjustment" was not an anamolie to California but occured in several
areas including Boston where HUD's estimate of the median income jumped
from $21,000 in 1980 to $27,200 in 1981.
In conclusion, under the CPI and median income model when resale takes
place at a time when interest rates are roughly equal to what they were at
the time of purchase, affordability is preserved. If resale occurs in a
time of lower interest rates, affordability may in fact increase. However
when interest rates rise considerably, as they did between 1975 and 1980,
affordability is completely lost.
The problem of controlling interest rates in addition to resale prices
is a difficult one. In his analysis of the issue, Mallach concludes that
because of the impact of interest rates on affordability,
The only ways, realistically, to ensure continued affordability of units
through resale controls are either (1) to set the rate of appreciation
substantially below the market rate increase, so that the price component
declines relative to to income; or (2) to establish a formula keyed
directly to affordability (p.154)
The Burlington and affordability formulas embody Mallach's
suggestions. The Burlington formula exemplifies his first suggestion by
tying resale price to 25% of the house's appreciated value. In doing so,
the impact of unit price on overall affordability is substantially reduced.
In the base case the affordability of the unit under the Burlington formula
increased (requiring a family at 63% instead of 78% of median income)
despite the rise in interest rates. Sensitivity table H illustrates the
way in which the lower purchase price offsets increases in interest rates.
It would require a 6% point increase in interest rates before affordability
would decline from the initial level. Maintaining affordability is not an
issue in regard to the affordability model since it does so by definition.
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In addition to indirectly controlling interest rates by substantially
lowering resale price or by basing resale price on affordability, a
community can directly influence interest rates in several ways. One
possibility is for the administrative agency in charge of the below-market
program to facilitate a new owner's assumption of the original owner's
mortgage. To the extent that this is possible the problems created due to
increases in interest rates are alleviated. Another option is for the
agency to establish a fund to underwrite the change in interest rate. Such
a fund could provide a second mortgage at an interest rate low enough to
make the effective rate equal to the original mortage.
Whichever formula a community ultimately decides upon, the above
analysis points out the importance of conducting financial projections.
Given both the term and the legal binding of these restrictions,
communities need to conduct such an analysis assuming both an inflationary
and stagnant economy. Without such an exploration advocates may find that
their battles to implement such restrictions were for naught.
CHAPTER FOUR: Administrative Issues:
Administrative issues are perhaps the least glamorous but nevertheless
a critical component of designing an effective resale restriction. The
type and level of administrative policies needed will differ with the type
of restriction, however several procedures are necessary to operate any
program. Administrative issues can be conceptualized around a controlled
unit's life cycle. The following diagram illustrates the possible
administrative issues associated with each stage.
ORIGINAL SALE:
marketing
verify buyer's income
applicant selection
DURING OCCUPANCY:
verify occupancy
maintain list of controlled units
approve permanent improvements
maintain list of qualified buyers
RESALE:
calculate resale price
verify buyer's income
refer eligible buyers to unit
insure fair marketing process
monitor sales transaction
The first stage includes issues surrounding the original sale of the
below market unit. These include marketing the unit, verifying applicants'
incomes, and ultimately selecting a buyer. The next stage are issues which
may arise during the first occupancy. These may include approving
permanent improvements to the dwelling unit (if the resale formula requires
approval), verifying owner occupancy (if such a restriction applies), and
maintaining data on controlled units, area-median income, interest rates,
etc. Finally, many issues arise around the resale of the unit. In most
cases an agency must calculate the maximum resale price and certify the new
owner's income. In addition the agency may be involved in the remarketing
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of the unit by maintaining a waiting list of eligible buyers and monitoring
the sale transaction.
Administrative tasks can also be separated into categories based on
the type of job: calculating the resale price, monitoring resale
restrictions and transfering units. Whereas the tasks associated with
calculating the resale price are specific to the formula a community
chooses, problems associated with monitoring and marketing are general to
all formulas.
Calculating Resale Price:
The administrative issues involved in calculating resale price are
fairly minimal. The main task which may be necessary is approval of
increases or decreases in the original purchase price. Under both the CPI
and median income model permanent improvements on the house can be added to
the base price of the resale formula. In addition, some communities reduce
the price to reflect depreciation and increases the price to include
closing expenses (brokerage and legal fees). In order to therefore
calculate the resale price some agency must be responsible for approving
the incurred costs and documenting that the work has in fact been
performed. This information must be recorded so that it is accessible at
the time of resale. Guidelines regarding allowable expenses must be
developed so that owners know what expenses are included and to insure that
all owners are treated uniformly.
Under the affordablility and Burlington models an approval process is
not necessary. The affordability model is not based on the initial
purchase price nor does it adjust for improvements to the unit. The
Burlington formula was specifically designed to minimize the need to make
such approvals. By tying the resale price to 25% of the change in the
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unit's appraised value, changes in the house's physical structure are
automatically evaluated.
In sum, the administrative tasks inherent in the four different
formulas are not very cumbersome. The Burlington model because of its
reliance on the private market to determine appreciation is the simpliest
to administer. Its dependence on appraisals relieves the agency from the
need to approve changes and relies on a process, reappraisal, which is
already integrated into the resale process. Affordability formulas require
some extra effort to maintain income and interest rate information and to
in turn consistently calculate resale price. CPI and median income
formulas require the most oversight in order to adjust purchase prices
fairly and regularly. However the information on which they rely is easily
attainable.
Monitoring Restrictions:
Regardless of whether or not adjustments must be made to the purchase
price, all of the resale formulas require some level of data collection.
At a minimum an agency must be responsible for recording and maintaining
the addresses of all restricted units, the owner's name and the original
purchase price. In addition, each formula requires that some index be
tracked on a regular basis be it CPI, median income, interest rates or
appraised values.
The monitoring of restrictions is also a fairly straight forward
administrative process. The required tasks are twofold. First in
communities in which owner occupancy is part of the restriction an agency
may want to periodically conduct random checks to insure compliance. Since
a list of controlled units will have already been established for
informational purposes, the same list can be used to select units for
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verification. Second, over the years in which the resale restriction is in
place an owner may need to contact the administrative agency. The
homeowner may be thinking about making improvements and have questions,
leaving town for a fixed period of time and need permission to sublet, or
moving and need to notify the agency of his/her intention to sell. In each
case it is important that the owner is responded to promptly as failure to
do so may both inconvenience the owner and jeopardize the city's right to
take action.
Unit Transfer Procedures:
The most complex administrative tasks revolve around the turnover of
the restricted unit. Under this category I include issues involving the
disposal of the unit such as selecting a new buyer, verifying that buyer's
income as eligible and overseeing the sale transaction to insure that it is
honest. Similar to the case with determining resale price, in the private
housing market most of these issues do not arise. Putting housing
discrimination aside for the moment, in the private sector the house is
sold to that family willing to pay the highest price. However, because
under resale restrictions a different criteria is employed, namely that the
unit go to another income eligible family and that families of the same
bracket have equal access to the unit, some sort of administrative
allocation process must be developed.
The way in which most communites I studied have responded to this
problem is to establish a waiting list. Interested qualified families are
placed on the list and notified when a restricted unit becomes available.
For example in Montgomery County, Maryland the Department of Housing and
Community Development is responsible for administering the below market
housing program. Beyond certifying the original and future owner
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purchaser's income the agency's primary role is to maintain a list of
eligible buyers. Individuals who meet income requirements can place their
name on a list and receive a certificate of eligibility. When a unit
becomes available individuals are notified. For the first 60 days the unit
is on the market only individuals on the list are eligible to purchase the
unit. If no eligible buyer is found within 60 days, the house must be
offered to the housing authority who has 30 days to respond. If the
housing authority declines, the owner may offer the unit to the general
public.
Theoretically there is no reason why communities need to maintain a
waiting list of interested, eligible buyers. Given that the resale
restriction is written into the deed, either the seller's attorney or title
insurance company would catch the restriction and require the potential
buyer to document his/her income (Mallach, 1984 p.15 4 ). In a modified
model, the owner would notify the administrative agency of his/her
intention to sell and find out the maximum resale price and maximum
eligible income. Once a buyer was selected he or she would have to have
his/her income certified as eligible by the administrative agency and the
sale documents approved.
While such an approach is certainly less administratively
burdensome, it creates several other problems. First, without some sort of
waiting list or lottery system there is no way the public agency can insure
compliance with fair marketing procedures. Second, absent a system which
distances the owner from the selection process resale restrictions open up
the possibility for either favoritism or graft. Put simply, in ordinary
market circumstances an owner's criteria would be to sell his/her house to
the highest bidder. However under a resale restriction this criteria is
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removed. In a scenario in which the owner must choose between several
eligible applicants it is likely that she/he will either give it to the
family they know or give it the family who can reward them in some other
way. Maintaining a waiting list not only avoids potential problems of
favoritism but in addition, can save both the community and the owner time
by informing qualified families looking for a home of the unit's
availability.
In sum, although a community can successfully minimize administrative
tasks associated with calculating resale price by choosing one formula over
another, reluctance to intervene in the transfer of the unit may mean that
in effect the unit is no longer available to most qualified families. To a
large extent this has been the experience of rent controlled units in
Manhattan where units are passed between friends and rarely become
available in the public market. In evaluating the trade-off between
administering a waiting list and leaving the responsibility of choosing a
new buyer to the individual, policy makers should consider the size and
politics of their particular community as well as the ability of an agency
to effectively carry out such a task.
Communities have chosen a range of agency types to administer the
resale restrictions. In several of the smaller towns a non-profit oversees
the below-market program including resale restrictions. Bedminister, New
Jersey is a good example. Its approach represents perhaps the most
comprehensive of the 13 communities examined. As part of the town's Mount
Laurel housing program, the community established a non-profit organization
specifically to administer restricted units. In many ways the organization
acts as a traditional housing authority maintaining a waiting list of
qualified applicants, approving permanent improvements and determining
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their value, monitioring compliance with the owner-occupancy requirement
and approving the sales transaction. In addition , the non-profit
establishes price schedules for allowable professional expenses incured in
selling and operates a revolving loan fund to prevent foreclosures.
In most of the larger communities an existing agency involved in
housing such as the housing authority or housing and community development
office administer the programs. In choosing which organization should take
responsibility for administration it is important to consider the agency's
ability to respond quickly, its durability and its expertise in housing
area.
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CHAPTER FIVE: Potential Institutional Barriers
Legal Issues
Along with ideological and technical issues, the implementation of
limited equity restrictions raises a series of legal issues. Although to
date it appears that no provision has been challenged in court, such
restrictions may potentially violate a series of property laws. While an
in depth examination of legal issues inherent in resale restrictions must
be left to the laywers, the following section outlines the major legal
concepts restrictions may violate. An understanding of these issues can
facilitate a design of restrictions which is more likely to withstand legal
challenge.
In general, resale restrictions fit into a larger body of policies
which create tension between the government's role as protector of an
individuals' private property versus as protector of the public's general
welfare. On the one hand, the American legal system closely protects an
individual's property rights including the right to sell, the right to
determine use and the right to make a profit. On the other hand, the legal
system recognizes a broad power of the state to promote the public good and
in doing so to often override the rights of an individual. Examples
include the right to constrain land use (zoning), the right to control
prices (rent control) and the right to take property (eminent domain).
Resale restrictions are subject to challenge as violations of at least
three specific legal principles: the rule against restraints on alienation,
the Sherman Acts prohibition of price fixing, and the rule against
perpetuities. Restraint on alienation is a common law principle which
prohibits the imposition of conditions which constrain an individual's
right to sell. Both the condition that the original owner first offer the
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house to the city or its designee, in legal terms the premptive right to
purchase, and the restriction that the unit be sold at a prearranged price
versus market value potentially violate this principle.
The rule against restraint on alienation has been codified into state
law in most areas of the United States. Therefore the legal interpretation
of the resale restriction is heavily dependent on the specific statuatory
and case law of the particular state in which the resale restriction is
applied. In California, the state in which the legal system has most
closely been studied in regard to this issue, conditions which require an
owner to offer his/her real estate to another individual have been
upheld.(Strauss and Stegman, 1979 p.238). In general, the right of first
refusal has long been recognized. A 1666 Conneticutt law required owners
to first offer their land to the state upon disposition.(Quinn, 1985 p.7)
On the other hand, the Courts interpretation of the requirement that
the unit be sold at a prearranged price is less certain. The clause
automatically faces a much stricter level of judicial scrutiny. California
courts have held that a preemptive right which provides for a fixed price
represents a "substantial curtailment" on an owner's ability to sell.
(Strauss and Stegman, 1979 p.238) While again no cases have been brought
over a restriction like a limited equity clause, the California Supreme
Court has established a criteria for evaluating such a clause.
In their analysis of the legality of resale restrictions Strauss and
Stegman outline this criteria. First, courts will examine "the purpose of
the restraint and method of determining the price" in order to judge the
reasonableness of the set price.(1979, p.238) Second, the courts will look
at the justification for the restraint. Specifically, they will look for
both a theoretical and practical reason for imposing the restriction. The
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courts will then weigh the impact of the restriction on alienation against
the justification for the restraint. In sum, Strauss and Stegman's
analysis points out the importance of the municipality having a justifiable
method of determining the resale price and stating a compelling reason for
imposing the restriction.
The second important potential legal challenge to resale restrictions
is that the restrictions violate the anti-trust provisions of the Sherman
Act. The Sherman Act prohibits "resale price maintenance" -- any contract
which fixes a price between two private individuals. Until recently
government activities of which resale restrictions could be considered were
generally excluded from anti-trust laws. However in 1978 the Supreme Court
in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and Light Company (98 S.Ct.1123,
1978) held that not all government activities were exempt.
According to the Court, under some circumstances cities and other similar
governmental instrumentalities may be subject to anti-trust liability.
The standard adopted by the plurality (of the Court) was that activities
of such governmental entities will escape anti-trust liability only if
those activities are'directed, authorized, or contemplated' by state
legislative policy."
(Strauss and Stegman, 1979 p.223)
In addition to state legislative policy, courts have recognized an
affirmative command by the judiciary as justifications for anti-competitive
behavior.
Whether or not a locality has the necessary state directive is an
issue which must be determined on a case-by- case basis. However, as
Mallach argues, given "the policy statements, statutes, court decisions and
the like in almost every state setting forth the provision of low and
moderate housing as an important public policy goal" it is more than likely
that municipalities will not be liable for anti-trust violations for resale
restrictions.(1984 p.143)
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At least two states meet a strict interpretation of Lafayette.
California, through a state statute, requires local governments to assure
the continued availability of any low and moderate income housing built
with "direct financial contributions" for thirty years. Direct
contributions include participating in write-downs of land costs,
infrastructure expenses or construction costs. The New Jersey Supreme
Court in Mt. Laurel II (92 N.J.158, 1983) mandates that communities using
inclusionary zoning address the issue of long term affordability and
recommends the use of limited equity resale restrictions as one option:
The problem of keeping lower income units available for lower income
people over time can be a difficult one...This problem,which
municipalities must address in order to assure they continue to meet
their fair share obligations, can be dealt with in two ways.. .A more
sophisticated approach,considered by Princeton Township, would have
established a two part control mechanism. First,disposition covenants
would have been created for all lower income units binding the owners and
renters of such units to sell or rent only at lower income levels.
Second, a Public Trust would have been whose trustees would have
administered the covenants and determined what would be lower income
levels over time.(1983 p.269)
The final legal principle which may present problems for resale
restrictions is the rule against perpetuities. The common law principal
against perpetuities is that "no interest is good unless it must vest, if
at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the
creation of the interest."(Haar and Liebman, 1982 p.452) In non-legal
terms, this means that no one interest in real estate can be longer than an
individual's life time plus twenty-one years. This issue applies to resale
restrictions through the period of time over which municipalities can
exercise their right of first refusal. While this does not create a
problem for most restrictions since the terms are limited to between ten
and sixty years, it may pose problems for communities which allow the city
the right to first purchase ad infinitum. For example, the Marin County
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Redevelopment Authority's right of refusal runs in perpetuity. By applying
the same restriction for 99 years, Lexington Massachusetts is able to
achieve the same result without risking a legal challenge on grounds of
violating the rule against perpetuites.
That resale restrictions may some day face legal challenge is not a
purely academic conjecture. As Davis has noted in discussing land trusts,
the more widespread such provisions become, the more likely they will be
challenged by real estate interests who are threatened by such requirements
or by an individual homeowner, who minus the restriction, would stand to
make a large profit.(1984,p.223) On the other hand, the above discussion
suggests that by carefully crafting restrictions policy makers can design
restrictions more likely to withstand legal challenge.
Recommendations:
1-Clearly state the justification for imposing each component of the
restriction.
2-Make connections in all legal documents between resale restrictions
and exisitng state legislative and judicial mandates to provide affordable
housing.
3-Clearly state the formula for determining the resale price and
document the owner's knowledge of the resale restriction by stating it
upfront as well as within all legal documents. In addition the community
may ask the owner to sign a disclosure form documenting his/her knowledge
of the restriction.
4-Impose resale restrictions for a maximum of 99 years versus in
perpetuity if violating the rule against perpetuities is a problem. A 99-
year clause which begins a new with each sale, in effect, achieves the same
goal.
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5- Consult real estate attorneys early on in the design process. State
laws and interpretations differ and therefore need to be examined on a
case-by-case basis. Also, by working with attorneys, it may be possible to
design a policy which avoids challenging legal principles. For example,
OKM Associates, a Boston-based consulting/developing firm is currently
renovating a school in North Cambridge which will include several below-
market condominiums. In addition to requiring the developer to skew the
prices internally to achieve affordability, the city of Cambridge is giving
a non-profit organization funds to further write down the prices. The non-
profit is using these funds to purchase an option on the property from the
lower-income family which will enable the non-profit to repurchase the unit
at the time of resale based on a limited-equity formula. By structuring the
transaction as an option instead of as a deed restriction the non-profit
may be avoiding the possibility of a future legal challenge.
Financing Issues:
Another area critical to resale restrictions is how such provisions
affect the ability of participants to get loans. Currently most
participants in below-market homeownership programs with resale
restrictions are getting financing from state housing finance agencies.
These agencies provide below market interest rates and low down payments
requirements by selling tax-exempt bonds.
Conventional banks when approached to finance a unit with a resale
restriction appear to be reluctant. Lenders' resistance may stem from four
areas: First, as a general rule lending institutions are conservative.
They are not quick to respond to new ideas and may be especially resistent
to enter into a situation where they are dealing with a "risky" mortgagor
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and an overseer (the municipality). Second, the lender may be concerned
with how the resale restriction affects the marketability of the unit.
Thirdly, the lender will also be concerned about what happen to the
property in the event of foreclosure. What happens to the city's right to
purchase? Does the restriction on price apply to the lender? If not, who
is entitled to any excess income generated by a foreclosure sale? Finally,
how does the restriction affect the ability of the lender to sell the
mortgage to a secondary market such as FHLMC or FNMA?
Of the four issues the last two appear to be the most serious.
Currently both FNMA and FHLMC's underwriting policy prohibits lending to
properties with resale restrictions. Because of this policy banks are
reluctant to lend as they do not want to be left holding a long-term,
fixed-rate mortgage in their portfolio.
FNMA and FHLMC policy stems from their concern over how restrictions
impact the rights of the first mortgagee. In this sense the bank's concern
over foreclosure and the secondary markets' restriction are one and the
same. Despite the stated policy to the contrary, in the past FNMA
officials have agreed to purchase restricted units. Three options appear
to alleviate their concerns. First, the deed may state that in the event
of foreclosure all restrictions on price, use and income will be removed.
Such a clause, while putting at rest the bank's fears, defeats the purpose
of placing a restriction and keeping the unit in the "public" stock of
housing.
A second approach is to state that in the event of foreclosure all
restrictions are waived provided that the administrative agency holding the
right of first refusal is notified ahead of time. The agency retains the
option to purchase the unit for the maximum resale price or the outstanding
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mortgage balance plus any reasonable expenses the bank has incurred during
foreclosure. This clause assures the bank that it will recoup its expenses
or be able to foreclose minus restrictions while also maintaining the
public's right to control resale price.
Finally a clause may state that in the event of foreclosure the
restrictions shall continue to apply. However should the bank find that it
is unable to recover its investment due to the restrictions it can request
that the agency waive the requirements. This achieves the same goal as the
second option but places the burden on the bank rather than on the
administrative agency.
Just because such clauses are acceptable to banks does not mean that
they will welcome financing homes with resale restrictions. They will most
likely need prodding by both the private and public sectors to overcome
their general dislike for non-uniform transactions. As resale restrictions
become more common banks will hopefully begin to put up less resistance to
financing restricted units.
Marketing
The issue of marketing is usually raised out of the concern that
resale restrictions will make selling the affordable units more difficult.
Both developers and town officials have questioned whether limitations on
equity will reduce demand for the units. In Lexington, Massachusetts when
the town decided to place long term, limited equity, resale restrictions on
moderate income condominiums and require income eligibility guidelines,
officials anticipated that units would sell very slowly. Instead, within
six days the town received twice as many applications as units.(Bowyer
Interview)
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In Orange County, California the term on the resale restriction was
initially set at thirty years. After being pressured by developers who
were concerned that they would not be able to market the units, the city
council reduced the option period to twenty years. In evaluating the
inclusionary housing program however, Schwartz and Johnston found that
demand for the below market units with the restrictions was in fact quite
strong.(p.14) Perhaps even more interesting, a survey of affordable
housing occupants in Orange County found that 74% felt that resale controls
were either "fair" of "somewhat fair". 83% believed their house was fairly
priced and that its value had kept up with inflation.(Mallach p.14 6)
The only community I surveyed that mentioned marketing problems was
Boulder, Colorado. Kathy McCormack, a housing planner for the Boulder
Housing Authority, stated that recently some developers have had trouble
selling units. She noted that the source of the problem is that because
the housing market in Boulder is soft, the below-market prices are infact
very close to the market price. Families who are eligible to buy below-
market units, may also be able to afford an unrestricted market unit. In
the event a developer cannot sell a unit after six months of marketing, he
or she can ask the city to waive the resale restriction.
This suggests that marketing units with resale restrictions is not a
significant issue if in fact the units are below-market. In most of the
communities where below-market programs are instituted, such houses are the
only opportunity participating families have to own a home. In these
situations the demand for affordable housing outweighs individuals' concern
with making an undiminished profit. However given a choice between
purchasing a restricted or non-restricted unit it is only logical that a
family choose a non-restricted unit. The problem in such an instance is
not so much resistance to the resale restriction but the price of the unit.
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CHAPTER SIX: Conclusion
Throughout this thesis several arguments and impediments to adopting
resale restrictions have been raised. They range from ideological
arguments to internal design issues to institutional barriers. Yet also
throughout this thesis is evidence that these barriers can be successfully
overcome.
In the first section ideological reasons for not imposing resale
restrictions are discussed. These arguments center around the belief that
restrictions discriminate against below-market homeowners and interfere
with the free market. Yet these arguments fail to address the fact that
without the below-market homeownership program, participants would not be
able to own a home. Furthermore, if restrictions are not applied, this
same opportunity may not be available to the next generation of moderate-
income families.
Ideological arguments also fail to recognize that resale restrictions
are but one of many restrictions which government programs impose on
monetary returns. In many cases the profits of the developer who created
the below-market housing were restricted. Most importantly, arguments
against adopting resale restrictions focus exclusively on but one of the
several benefits of homeownership: the ability to make a profit. Yet even
under the most restrictive resale formula, a family still benefits from
below-market housing costs, interest and property tax deductions, and the
security and stability of controlling one's own shelter.
Several practical problems have also been cited as reasons to not
impose resale restrictions. Conservative economists have argued that
resale restrictions limit property taxes and provide disincentives for the
up-keep of a home. Liberals and conservatives alike have identified the
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administrative, financing, marketing and legal problems restrictions may
create. Yet the review of each of these issues suggests that none of these
problems are so cumbersome as to make instituting restrictions unviable.
The argument against property taxes fails to consider the issue in a
cost-benefit analysis. One can not discuss the impact of lower property
tax collection without discussing the savings from not having to provide an
alternative affordable unit. The discussions of administrative and
marketing issues illustrate that these problems can be reduced if not
allievated by carefully designing a program. Legal and financial issues
are the greatest barriers to restrictions yet even these potential problems
can be overcome by working with bankers, lawyers and government officials
when designing restrictions.
This is not to suggest that implementing resale restrictions is an
easy process. Due to the institutional barriers against restrictions a
critical component of adopting restrictions must be to advocate for the
legitimacy of limited equity clauses. Even if financing and legal issues
cease to exist, choosing a formula which operates effectively in constantly
changing market environments is a challenge.
An important conclusion of this study is that while many communities
have in fact adopted restrictions and managed institutional problems, most
have adopted formulas which do not guarantee the long term affordability of
the unit. This appears to have been a technical mistake rather than an
ideological choice. The section on choosing a pricing mechanism contained
in Chapter 3 illustrates that while the formulas change in CPI and change
in median income may be effective mechanisms for assuring affordability for
limited equity cooperatives, these formulas do not maintain affordability
when applied to non-cooperative housing. In instituting the CPI and median
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income formulas, policy makers have overlooked the critical role interest
rates play in determining affordability.
On the other hand, the analysis of the Burlington and affordability
formula suggests that these two formulas can effectively maintain
affordability. In addition, both require less administrative oversight.
The Burlington model, by tying resale price to a percentage of market
appreciation versus CPI, income or affordability, has the added benefit of
allowing the owner to monetarily capture improvements in the community at
large as well as in the individual house. Yet the analysis also illustrates
the trade-offs inherent in these formulas between guaranteeing an owner a
return on investment and maintaining affordability. The affordability
model because of its sensitivity to changes in interest rates may yield a
resale price which is actually less than what the original purchase price.
The Burlington model while assuring the owner of a recouping the purchase
price in nominal dollars does not definitionally guarantee that the price
is adjusted for inflation.
In sum, there is no "perfect" formula. As table 4 illustrates,
embedded in each restriction are trade-offs between maintaining
affordability and generating a profit. Yet, what is both exciting and
difficult about designing resale restrictions is that they force planners
to identify the tension between housing as a commodity and housing as
affordable shelter. Despite all the debate one would suspect goes into
designing a below-market homeownership program, it is not until the issue
of resale' arises that policymakers must definitively adddress the primary
goal of the program- to give a family an opportunity to be a homeowner or
to provide affordable shelter. However, the failure to recognize that
profitmaking is only one of many benefits of owning a home places
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unjustifiable significance on this choice. Creating a stock of housing
which will remain affordable in the long-term through homeownership, while
not easy, is only impossible if policy makers focus on the profit-making
component of ownership to the exclusion of all else.
TABLE 4: COMPARISON OF 4 RESALE FORMULAS
CHANGE IN CPI
CHANGE IN MEDIAN INCOME
AFFORDABILITY
BURLINGTON
RECOUP
INVESTMENT IN
CURRENT DOLLARS
- -------
RECOUP INVESTMENT
IN CONSTANT
DOLLARS
----------- -----------I
RETURN ON
INVESTMENT
'2
----------------------------------------I
2.5
-------------------------------I
3
2.5--- -
M^ INTA IN
AFFORDABILITY
3-
3
SCALE
I Accomplishes Goal by Definition
2 = Accomplishes Goal Under Most Conditions
3 = Does Not Accomplish Goals under Most Conditions
4 Does Not Accomplish Goal By Definition
Note: A rating of 1 or 4 is based on a conceptual analysis
A rating of 2, 2.5, or 3 is based on the sensitivity analysis
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TRAOLE VI
ASSUMPT IONS FOR MODEL
PURCHRSING ASSUMPTIONS
Year of Purchase
Year of Resale
Original Price
Mart gage
00wnpaymient
Interest in Yr of Purchase
Interest in Yr of Sale
Term
INDICES
Median Income in Yr. of Purchase
Median Income in Yr. of Turnover
Market Price in Yr of Purchase
Market Price in Yr of Sale
CPI in Yr of Purchase
CPI in Yr of Resale
Inflation Rate
TAX RSSUMPT IONS
Marginal Tax Rate
Property Tax
Personal Deduct ions
Standard Deduction
HOUSING EXPENSE ASSUMPTIONS
Utilities Expense
Insurance Rate
Repairs and Maintenance Expense
Brokerage Fee
OTHER ASSUMPTIONS
Imput ed Pental Value
Hurdle Pate
1975 t
1985
$32,000|
$30,400
$1, 600
9. 10%|
11.80%|
30 |
$15,450
$32,300
$44,300
$95,133
162.1
317.2
1.07
30%:
$25 |
5% of Income!
$3,200 :
SOURCES
Calculated to make affordable to family of 4 at 78% of median income in 1975
Effective rate on loans closed on existing homes as compiled by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
Effective rate on loans closed on new homes as compiled by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
Median Income for Family of 4 in Boston SMSA as estimated by the Depatment of Housing and Urban Develo-pment
Median Income for Family of 4 in Boston SMSA as estimated by the Depatment of Housing and Urban Development
Average sales price of kinds of houses sold as estimated by "Price Index of New One-Family Houses Sold", Bureau of the Census, C-27
Average sales price of kinds of houses sold as estimated by "Price Index of New One-Family Houses Sold", Bureau of the Census, C-27
As Reported in the Monthly Labor Review for All Urban Consumers
As Reported in the Monthly Labor Review for All Urban Consumers
As calculated based on change in CPI
Average Monthly expense as claculated by U.S. Dept. of HUD "Characteristics of 1-Family Homes,Sec.203.
Douglas Diamond "Taxes,Inflation and Speculation and the Cost of Homeownership"
Internal Revenue Service - Married Couple Filing Jointly
$42 : Average Monthly expense as; claculated by U.S. Dept. of HUD "Characteristics of I-Family Homes,Sec.203.
$9 | Average Monthly expense as claculated by U.S. Dept. of HUD "Characteristics of I-Family Homes,Sec.203.
$22 Average Monthly expense as claculated by U.S. Dept. of HUD "Characteristics of 1-Family Homes,Sec.203.
'6%: Industry Standard
Industry Standard
MAOLE 6: LIST OF MAJOP VRPIABLES
1975 - 1915
Yoar
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1903
1984
19G5
X Change 8'tween 79 &85
Annual Pate of Growth
CP I Median
Income
162.1
170.5
181.5 :
195.4
217.4
246.0
272.4
289. 1
298.4
310. 7
i17. 2
96%:
6.94%:
I nt erest House
Pate Apprec iation
$15, 450
$17, 200
$18,000
$18, 000
$19, 401
$21,800
$27, 200u
$27,2 -0
$30,800
$31, 000$32, 300
109%:
7.65X: n/a
9.04 X:
9.00:
9. 70X:
11. 16%
13.95%:.
16. 55%:
15.82x:
13. 45x:
12. 49%
11. 80%:
3ox:
$44, 300
$48,100
$54,200
$62, 100
$70, 900
$78,700
$85, 300
$87, 600
$89,700
$93, 200
$95, 133
115%
7.94%
1- CPI for urban consumers on all items. Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics "Montly Labor Review"
2- Median Income data based on median household income for a family of four in current dollars. Source:U.S. Dept. HUD
3- 1975 is interest rate for new single family homes. 1976-85 is interest rate for existing single family homes. Source:Federal Home Loan Bank Board
4- Hverage sales price of kinds of houses. Source: Price Index of New One-Family Houses Sold, U.S. Census C27
U1
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CPI MODEL
RATE OF RETURN UNDER RESALE RESTRICTIONS
1975-85 Analysis
Table I: Value of Tax Benefits
LOAN
YEAR BALANCE AMORTIZATION
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
9
10
11
$30,400
$30,181
$29,942
$29,682
$29,397
$29,087
$28,749
$28,380
$27,977
$27,538
$27,058
$219
$239
$261
$284
$310
$338
$369
$403
$439
$479
INTEREST
$2,766
$2,746
$2,725
$2,701
$2,675
$2,647
$2,616
$2,583
$2,546
$2,506
TOTAL
PROPERTY OTHER ITEMIZED
TAX DEDUCTIONS DEDUCTION
$300
$321
$344
$368
$394
$421
$451
$482
$516
$552
$605
$647
$692
$741
$793
$848
$908
$971
$1,039
$1,112
$3,672
$3,715
$3,761
$3,810
$3,862
$3,917
$3,975
$4,036
$4,101
$4,170
TABLE 11: CALCULATION OF NET HOUSING COST
YEAR MORTGAGE PROPERTY
PhT TAX
1
2
3
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
$2,985
$2,985
$2,985
$2,985
$2,985
$2,985
$2,985
$2,985
$2,985
$2,985
$2,985
$300
$321
$344
$368
$394
$421
$451
$482
$516
$552
INSURANLE UTILITIES REPAIRS 6
MAINTENANCE
$103
$111
$118
$127
$135
$145
M15
$166
$178
$1?0
$504
$539
$577
$617
$661
$707
$756
$809
$866
927
$264
$282
$302
$323
$346
$370
$396
$424
$454
$485
TOTAL IMPUTED NET
HSING EXPENSE RENT EXPENSES
($4,157)
($4,239)
($4,327)
($4,421)
($4,521)
($4,629)
($4,744)
($4,867)
($4,999)
($5,139)
$2,880
$3,082
$3,297
$3,528
$3,775
$4,039
$4,322
$4,625
$4,948
$5,295
($1,277)
($1,157)
($1,029)
($893)
($746)
($589)
($422)
($242)
($50)
$155
NET VALUE
OF DEDUCTION
BENEFIT
-
STANDARD
DEDUCTION
$3,400
$3,400
$3,400
$3,400
$3,400
$3,400
$3,400
$3,400
$3,400
$3,400
$272
$315
$361
$410
$462
$517
$575
$636
$701
$770
$81
$95
$108
$123
$139
$155
$172
$191
$210
$231
PV of NET
($4,587)
Table III: Sales Proceeds
Sales Price $62,597
Loan Balance ($27,058)
Sales Cost ($3,756)
Net Sales Proceeds (NSP) $31,783
Table IV: Return an Inv:stment
YEAR DOWNPMT TAX NET NET
BENEFIT HSINS COST SALE PROCEEDS TOTAL
0 -1600 ($1,600)
I$1 ($1,277) ($1,196)
2 $95 ($1,157) ($1,063)
3 $108 ($1,029) ($921)
4 $123 ($893) ($770)
5 $139 ($746) ($608)
6 $155 ($589) ($434)
7 $172 ($422) ($249)
8 $191 ($242) ($51)
9 $210 ($50) $110
10 $231 $155 $31,783 $32,169
11
NET PRESENT VALUE
IRR
$6,285
21.521
AFFORDABILITY ANALYSIS OF PURCHASE PRICE
CPI MODEL
Unit Cost IPP)
Percent Mortgaged (PM)
Mortgage Ast.
Interest Rate (i)
Mortgage Payst.
Mortgage Insurance
Property Insurance
Property Taxes
Total Housing Cost (MONTHLY)
Required Income (1 301)
1 of Med. Inc. in Yr. of Purchase
Per Year I
$32,000 :
9511
$30,400 I
9.1% 1
$2,985 :
$103 1
$240 I
$300 I
$3,629 1
$12,097 1
78I
Per Month 1
n/a. 1
nia I
$249
$9 1
$20 I
$25
$302
$1,008 1
Assumptions
downpayment of 5%
Financing for 30 yrs
.0034 of Mortgage
.0075 * unit cost
(80% AV * .01642 sinus $120 o/o credit)
Mortgage Paysentsinsuranceotaxes
cannot exceed 301 of income
AFFORDABILITY ANALYSIS OF RESALE PRICE
Unit Cost (RP)
Percent Mortgaged (PM)
Mortgage Ast.
Interest Rate (1_2)
Mortgage Payct.
Mortgage Insurance
Property Insurance
Property Taxes
Total Housing Cost (MONTHLY)
Required Income (Q 30%)
% of Ned. Inc. in Yr. of Sale
Per Year Per Month I
$62,597 I n/a I
9511 n/a a
$59,467 I
9.1Z a
$5,840 1 $487 1
$202 $!7 I
$469 1 $39 I
$702 1 $59 1
$7,214 1 8601
$24,045 1 $2,004 I
74z:
Assumptions
downpayment of 5%
Financing for 30 yrs
.0034 of Mortgage
.0075 * intt cost
(801 AV * .01642 sinus $120 o/o credit)
Mortgage Payeentsingurancetaxes
cannot exceed 30% of income
CHANGE IN MEDIAN INCOME MODEL
RATE OF RETURN UNDER RESALE RESTRICTIONS
1975-85 Analysis
LOAN
YEAR BALANCE AMORTIZATION
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
I I
$30,400$30, 181
$29,942
$29,682
$29,397$29,087$28,749$28 380$27,977$27 538$27,058
$219$239$261
$284$310
$338$369
$403
$439
$479
TABLE 1: VALUE OF TAX BENEFITS
TOTAL
PROPERTY OTHER ITEMIZED STANDARD NET VALUE BENEFIT
INTEREST TAX DEDUCTIONS DEDUCTION DEDUCTION OF DEDUCTION
$2,766
$2,746
$2,725$2,701
$2,675
$2,647
$2 616$2,583
$2,546
$2,506
$300
$321$344$368$394$421$451$482
$516$552
$605$647$692$741
$793$848$908$971
$1 039$1, 112
$3,672$3 715
$3,761
$3,810
$3,862
$3,917
$3 975
$4,036
$4 101$4,170
$3,400
$3,400
$3,400$3,400$3,400
$3,400
$3 400$3,400
$3 400$3,400
$272$315
$361$410$462$517$575
$636$701$770
TABLE 11: CALCULATION OF NET HOUSING COSI
YEAR MORTGAGE PROPERTY
PMT TAX
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
$2,985
$2,985$2,985$2,985
$2,985$2,985
$2,985
$2 985
$2,985
$2 985$2,985
$300$321
$344
$318$394
$4?1
$451
$482$516$552
INSURANCE UTILITIES REPAIRS & TOTAL IMPUTED
MAINTENANCE HSING EXPENSE RENT
$103
$111$118
$127$135
$145$155
$166$178
$190
$504
$539$577
$617
$661$707
$756
$809$866$927
$264
$282$302
$323$346
$370$396
$424$454$485
($4,157)
($4,239)($4,327)
($4,421)($4,521)($4,629)
($4,744)($4 867)
($4,999)($5,139)
$2,880$3,082
$3,297
$3,528
$3,775$4,039
$4,322
$4,625$4,948$5,295
$81
$95$108
$123$139
$155$172$191
$210
$231
NET
EXPENSES
($1,277)
($1 157)
($1 029)
(1893)
($746)
($589)
($422)
($242)
($50)
$155
PY of NET
($4,587)
Table III: Sales Proceeds
Sales Price $66,900
Loan Balance ($27,058)
Sales Cost ($4 014)
Net Sales Proceeds (NSP) $355827
Table IV: Return on Investment
YEAR DOWNPMT TAX NET NET
BENEFIT HSING COST SALE PROCEEDS TOTAL
0 -1600 ($1 600)
1 $1 ($1,277) ($1,196)
2 $95 ($1,157) ($1 063)
3 $108 ($1 029) (1921)
4 $123 (1893) ($770)
5 $139 ($746) ($608)
6 $155 ($589) ($434)
7 $172 ($422) ($249)
8 $191 ($242) ($51)
9 $210 ($50) $160
10 $231 $155 $35,827 $36,214
11
NET PRESENT VALUE $7 702
IRR 21.25%
AFFORDABILITY ANALYSIS OF PURCHASE PRICE
MEDIAN INCOME MODEL
Unit Cost (PP)
Percent Mortgaged (PM)
Mortgage Amt.
Interest Rate (i)
Mortgage Paymt.
Mortgage Insurance
Proper y Insurance
Property Taxes
Total Housing Cost (MONTHLY)
Required Income (t 301)
1 of Med. Inc. in Yr. of Purchase
Per Year i
$32,000 1
9511|
$30,400 1
9.111
$2 985 11
1103
$240
$300 |
$3,629 1
$12,097
7811
Per Month I
i/a 1
n/a
$249
$9 |
$20 I
$25
$302
51,008 1
I
Assumptions
downpayment of 5%
Financing for 30 yrs
.0034 of Mortgage
.0075 * unit cost
(801 AV * .01642 minus $120 o/o credit)
Mortgage Payments+insurance+taxes
cannot exceed 301 of income
-AAFF-RA--L- --------ANALY-S-OFRESAL-P
ri AFFORDABILITY ANALYSIS OF RESALE PRICE
Unit Cost (RP)
Percent Mortgaged (PM)
Mortgage Amt.
Interest Rate (i 2)
Mortgage Payat. ~
Mortgage Insurance
Property Insurance
Property Taxes
Total Housing Cost (MONTHLY)
Required Income It 301)
I of Med. Inc. in Yr. of Sale
Per Year 1$66,900 1
951X$63 555 1
11.811
$7 773 1
1216 I$502 |$759 1
$9,250 1
$30,833
9511
Per Month 1
n/a 1
n/a 1
$648
£1B I
$42 1
$63
$771
$2,569 1
Assumptions
downpayment of 51
Financing for 30 yrs
.0034 of Mortgage
.0075 * unit cost
(801 AV # .01642 minus $120 o/o credit)
Mortgage Payaents+insurance+taxes
cannot exceed 301 of income
AFFORDABILITY MODEL
RATE OF RETURN UNDER RESALE RESTRICTIONS
1975-85 Analysis
LOAN
YEAR BALANCE AMORTIZATION
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
B
9
10
11
$30,400$30, 181$29,942
$29, 682$29,397$29,087$28, 749$28,380
$27,977
$27 538
$27,058
$219$239$261
$284$310$338$369$403$439$479
TABLE 1: VALUE OF TAX BENEFITS
TOTAL
PROPERTY OTHER ITEMIZED STANDARD NET VALUE BENEFIT
INTEREST TAX DEDUCTIONS DEDUCTION DEDUCTION OF DEDUCTION
$2,766
$2,746
$2,725
$2,701
$2,675$2,647
$2,616
$2,583
$2,546
$2,536
$300
$321$344
$368$394$421$451$482
$516$552
$605$647$692
$741$793$848$908
$?71
$1 039
$1,112
$3,672
$3,715
$3,761$3,810
$3,862
$3,917
$3 975
$4,036
$4 101
$4,170
$3,400$3,400
$3,400
$3,400
$3,400$3,400
$3,400
$3 400
$3,400$3,400
$272$315
$361
$410$462$517$575$636
$701
$770
TABLE II: CALCULATION OF NET HOUSING COST
YEAR MORTGAGE PROPERTY
PHT TAX
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
$2,985
$2,985
$2,985$2,985
$2,985
$2,985
$2, 985$2 985
$2,985
$2 985
$2,985
$300$321
$344
4368$394
$421
*451
$482
$516
$552
INSURANCE UTILITIES REPAIRS & TOTAL IMPUTED
MAINTENANCE HRIN6 EXPENSE RENT
$103
$111
$118
$127$135$145$155
$166
$178
$190
$504$539
$577$617$661$707
$756$809$866
$927
$264
$282
$302
$323$346
$370
$396
$424
$454
$485
($4,157)($4,239)
($4,327)
($4,421)
($4,521)
($4,629)
($4,744)($4,867)($4 999)($5,139)
$2,880
$3,082$3,297
$3,528
$3,775
$4,039
$4,322$4 625
$4,948
$5,295
$81$95
$108
$123$139$155$172
$191
$210$231
NET
EXPENSES
($1,277)($1,157)
($1 029)(1893)($746)($589)($422)($242)($50)
$155
PV of NET
($4,587)
Table III: Sales Proceeds
Sales Price $55 000
Loan Balance ($27,058)
Sales Cost ($3 300)
Net Sales Proceeds (NSP) $24,642
Table IV: Return an Investaent
YEAR DOWNPNT TAX NET NET
BENEFIT HSING COST SALE PROCEEDS TOTAL
0 -1600 ($1,600)
1 $81 ($1,277) ($1,196)
2 $95 (81 157) ($1 063)
3 $108 (SI 029) (1921)
4 $123 (1893) ($770)
5 £139 ($746) ($608)
6 $155 ($589) ($434)
7 $172 ($422) ($249)
8 $191 ($242) ($51)
9 $210 (£50) $160
10 $231 $155 $24,642 $25,028
11
NET PRESENT VALUE $3 782
IRR 1.90%
AFFORDABILITY ANALYSIS OF PURCHASE PRICE
AFFORDABILITY MODEL
Unit Cost (PP)
Percent Mortgaged (PM)
Mortgage Amt.
Interest Rate 1i)
Mortgage Payat.
Mortga e Insurance
Property Insurance
Proper y Taxes
Total Housing Cost (MONTHLY)
Required Income (1 301)
1 of Med. Inc. in Yr. of Purchase
Per Year 1
$32,000 :
95%11
$30,400 I
9.111
$2 985 !103 1
$240 I
$300 1
$3,629
$12,097 I
78%|
Per Month I Assumptions
n/a |
n/a 1 downpaysent of 5%
$249 1 Financing for 30 yrs
$9 | .0034 of Mortgage
820 : .0075 # unit cost$25 1 (80! AV # .01642 minus $120 o/o credit)
$302 1
$1,008
Mortgage Paysents+insurance+taxes
cannot exceed 301 of income
AFFORDABILITY ANALYSIS OF RESALE PRICE
U1
Unit Cost (RP)
Percent Mortgaged (PM)
Mortgage Amt.
Interest Rate (i 2)
Mortgage Paymt. ~
Mortgage Insurance
Property Insurance
Property Taxes
Total Housing Cost (MONTHLY)
Required Income Q 301)
1 of Med. Inc. in Yr. of Sale
Per Year |
$55,000 I
951|
$52 250 1
11.8%1:
$6 391 1
178 I
$413 |
$602
$7,583 1
$25,277
78%
Per Month I
n/a
n/a
$533 1
$15 I
$34
$50 I
5632 1
$2,106
Assumptions
downpayment of 51
Financing for 30 yrs
.0034 of Mortgage
.0075 * unit cost
(80 AV * .01642 minus $120 o/o credit)
Mortgage Payments+insurance+taxes
cannot exceed 301 of income
BURLINGTON MODEL
RATE OF RETURN UNDER RESALE RESTRICTIONS
1975-85 Analysis
TABLE 1: VALUE OF TAX BENEFITS
LOAN
YEAR BALANCE AMORTIlATION
1 $30,400 $219
2 $30,181 $239
3 $29,942 $261
4 $29,682 $284
5 $29,397 $310
6 $29,087 $338
7 $28,749 $369
B $28,380 $403
9 $27,977 $439
10 $27,538 $479
I I $27,058
INTEREST
$2,766
$2,746
$2,725
$2,701
$2,675
$2,647
$2,616
$2,583
$2,546
$2,506
TOTAL
PROPERTY OTHER ITEMIZED
TAX DEDUCTIONS DEDUCTION
$300
$321
$344
$368
$394
$421
$451
$482
$516
$552
$605
$647
$692
$741
$793
$848
$908
$971
$1,039
$1,112
$3,672
$3,715
$3,761
$3,810
$3,862
$3,917
$3,975
$4,036
$4,101
$4,170
STANDARD NET VALUE
DEDUCTION OF DEDUCTION
$3,400
$3,400
$3,400
$3,400
$3,400
$3,400
$3,400
$3,400
$3,400
$3,400
$272
$315
$361
$410
$462
$517
$575
$636
$701
$770
TABLE II: CALCULATION OF NET HOUSINS COST
YEAR MORTGAGE PROPERTY
PMT TAX
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
$2,985
$2,985
$2,985
$2,985
$2,985
$2,985
$2,985
$2,985
$2,985
$2,985
$2,985
$300
$321
$344
$368
$394
$421
$451
$482
$51L
4 5 '2
INSURANCE UTILITIES REPAIRS & TOTAL IMPUTED NET
MAINTENANCE HSINS EXPENSE RENT EXPENSES
$103
$111
$118
$127
$135
$145
$155
$166
$178
$199
$504
$539
$577
$617
$661
$707
$756
$809
$866
$927
$264
$282
$302
$323
$346
$370
$396
$424
$454
$485
($4,157)
($4,239)
($4,327)
($4,421)
($4,521)
($4,629)
($4,744)
($4,867)
($4,999)
($5,139)
$2, 880
$3,082
$3,297
$3,528
$3,775
$4,039
$4,322
$4,625
$4,948
$5,295
($1,277)
($1,157)
($1,029)
($893)
($746)
($589)
($422)
($242)
($50)
$155
BENEFIT
$81
$95
$108
$123
$139
$155
$172
$191
$210
$231
PV of NET
($4,587)
Table Ilt: Sales Proceeds
Sales Price
Loan Balance
Sales Cost
Net Sales Proceeds INSP)
$44,708
($27,058)
($2,682)
$14,967
Table IV: Return on Investment
YEAR DOWNPMT NET NET
HSING COST SALE PROCEEDS TOTAL
-1600
$81 ($1,277)
$95
$108
$123
$139
$155
$172
$191
$210
$231
($1,157)
($1,029)
($893)
($746)
($589)
($422)
($242)
($50)
$155
($1,600)
($1,196)
($1,063)
($921)
($770)
($608)
($434)
($249)
($51)
$160
$14,967 $15,354
NET PRESENT VALUE
IRR
TAX
RENEFIT
0
2
3
4
6
7
8
9
10
11
$391
11.04%
AFFORDABILITY ANALYSIS OF PURCHASE PRICE
Burlington Model
Unit Cost (PP)
Percent Mortgaged (PM)
Mortgage Amt.
Interest Rate 1i)
Mortgage Paymt.
Mortgage Insurance
Property Insurance
Property Taxes
Total Housing Cost (MONTHLY)
Required Income (1 301)
1 of Med. Inc. in Yr. of Purchase
Per Year |
$32,000 1
9511
$30,400 I
9.1II
$2,985 1
$103 |
$240 1
$300
$3,629 1
$12,097 1
7811
Per Month I
n/a
n/a I
$249
S9 1
$20 I
$25
$302
$1,008
Assuaptions
downpayment of 51
Financing for 30 yrs
.0034 of Mortgage
.0075 * uinit cost
(B01 AV * .01642 minus $120 o/o credit)
Mortgage Payments+insurance+taxes
cannot exceed 301 of income
AFFORDABILITY ANALYSIS OF RESALE PRICE
Unit Cost (RP)
Percent Mortgaged (PM)
Mortgage Amt.
Interest Rate (1_2)
Mortgage Payat.
Mortgage Insurance
Property Insurance
Property Taxes
Total Housing Cost (MONTHLY)
Required Income ( 301)
I of Med. Inc. in Yr. of Sale
Per Year I Per Month
$44,708 I n/a
9511 n/a I
$42,473 |
11.8 :
$5,195 1 $433 I
$144 I $12 1
$335 1 $28 I
$467 I $39 I
$6,142 $512 I
$20,472 I $1,706 1
631
Assumptions
downpayment of 51
Financing for 30 yrs
.0034 of Mortgage
.0075 * unit cost
(801 AV * .01642 minus $120 o/o credit)
Mortgage Paysents+insurance+taxes
cannot exceed 301 of income
MARKET MODEL
RATE OF RETURN UNDER RESALE RESTRICTIONS
1975-85 Analysis
LOAN
YEAR BALANCE AMORTIZATION
I $30,400 $219
2 $30,181 $239
3 $29,942 $261
4 $29,682 $284
5 $29,397 $310
6 $29,087 $338
7 $28,749 $369
B $28 380 $403
9 $27,977 $439
10 $27 538 $479
11 $27,058
INTEREST
$2,766
$2,746$2, 725
$2,701
$2,675
$2,647$2,616
$2, 583
$2 546
$2,506
TABLE 1: VALUE OF TAX BENEFITS
TOTAL
PROPERTY OTHER ITEMIZED
TAX DEDUCTIONS DEDUCTION
$300$321$344$368$394$421$451$482
$516$552
$605$647$692$741$793$848$908$971
$1,039$1,112
$3,672
$3,715
$3,761
$3,810
$3,862
$3,917
$3 975$4,036
$4 101
$4,170
STANDARD NET VALUE
DEDUCTION OF DEDUCTION
$3,400
$3, 400
$3,400
$3,400
$3,400
$3,400
$3 400
$3,400
$3 400
$3,400
$272$315$361$410$462$517$575$636
$701$770
TABLE II: CALCULATION OF NET HOUSINS COST
YEAR MORTGASE PROPERTY
PMT TAX
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
$2,985
$2,985$2,985$2,985
$2,985$2,985
$2,985
$2 985
$2,985
$2 985
$2,985
$300
$321$344$368
$394
$421$451
$482
$516
$552
INSURANCE UTILITIES REPAIRS & TOTAL IMPUTED
MAINTENANCE HSING EXPENSE RENT
$103
$111$118
$127$135$145$155
$166
$178
$190
$504
$539$577
$617$661
$707$756
$809
$866$927
$264
$282
$302$323
$346
$370
$396
$424
$454
$485
($4,157)($4,239)
($4,327)($4,421)
($4 521)($4,629)($4 744)($4,867)
($4,999)($5,139)
$2,880$3,082
$3,297$3,528
$3,775$4,039
$4,322
$4,625$4,948
$5,295
BENEFIT PV
$81$95$108$123$139
$155$172$191
$210$231 $847
NET
EXPENSES
($1,277)($1 157)
($1 029)
(i893)($746)($589)($422)($242)($50)
$155
PV of NET
($4,587)
D-
Table IlI: Sales Proceeds
Sales Price $95 133
Loan Balance ($27,058)
Sales Cost (5 708)
Net Sales Proceeds (NSP) $62,367
Table IV: Return on Investment
YEAR DOWNPMT TAX NET NET
BENEFIT HSIN8 COST SALE PROCEEDS TOTAL
0 -1600 ($1,600)
$81 ($1,277) ($1 196)
2 $95 ($1,157) ($1 063)
3 $108 ($1 029) (i921)
4 $123 (1893) ($770)
5 $139 ($746) ($608)
6 $155 ($589) ($434)
7 $172 ($422) ($249)
8 $191 ($242) ($51)
9 $210 ($50) $160
10 $231 $155 $62,367 $62,753
11
NET PRESENT VALUE $17 004
IRR 31.52%
AFFORDABILITY ANALYSIS OF PURCHASE PRICE
MARKET MODEL
Unit Cost (PP)
Percent Mortgaged (PM)
Mortgage Amt.
Interest Rite (i)
Mortgage PayAt.
Mortgage Insurance
Property Insurance
Property Taxes
Total Housing Cost (MONTHLY)
Required Income (Q 301)
1 of Med. Inc. in Yr. of Purchase
Per Year i,
$32,000 1
9511
$30,400 1
9.111
$2 985 1
1103 It
$240 1
$300
$3,629 1
$12,097
781
Per Month 1
n/a I
n/a i
$249
$9
$20 1
$25
$302 1
$1,008
Assumptions
downpayment of 51
Financing for 30 yrs
.0034 of Mortgage
.0075 * unit cost
(80 AV * .01642 sinus $120 a/c credit)
Mortgage Payaentstinsurance+taxes
cannot exceed 301 of income
AFFORDABILITY ANALYSIS OF RESALE PRICE
Unit Cost (RP)
Percent Mortgaged (PM)
Mortgage Amt.
Interest Rate (i-2)
Mortgage Payat.
Mortgage Insurance
Property Insurance
Property Taxes
Total Housing Cost (MONTHLY)
Required Income (1 301)
1 of Red. Inc. in Yr. of Sale
Per Year I
$95,133 !
9511,
$90 376 i
1I.8X:,
$11 054 11
1307 1$713 I
$1,130 I
$13,204 I
$44,014 I
13611|
Per Month 1
n/a
n/a I
$921 I$26 i
$59 I
$94 I
$1,100 I
$3,668 I
Assumptions
downpayment of 5%
Financing for 30 yrs
.0034 of Mortgage
.0075 * unit cost
(0% AV * .01642 minus $120 x/o credit)
Mortgage Paysents+insurance+taxes
cannot exceed 30% of income
co
I-A
SENSITIVITY TABLES
82
SENSITIVITY TABLES A-D
Sensitivity Analyses for CPI Model
A - Impact of Change in Resale Price on IRR and NPV
CPI +$NPV
0.01 (82,693)
0.02 ($1,487)
0.03 ($170)
0.04 $1,267
0.05 $2,834
0.06 $4,542
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.1
0.11
0.12
0.13
0.14
0.15
0.16
0.17
0.18
0.19
$6,401
$8,423
$10,620
$13,007
$15,597
$18,406
$21,450
$24,746
$28,313
$32,170
$36,339
$40,841
$45,700
+$IRR
-0.34%
5.21%
9.531
13.131
16.27%
19.091
21.671
24.071
26.321
28.461
30.51%
32.471
34.371
36.211
38.001
39.751
41.471
43.151
44.80 
8- Impact of Change in Interest Rate on Affordability
I CHANGE +AFF
5.001 -45.051
5.501 -39.56%
6.001 -34.071
6.501 -28.57%
7.001 -23.081
7.501 -17.581
8.001 -12.091
8.501 -6.591
9.101 0.002
9.501 4.401
10.001 9.89%
10.501 15.381
11.00% 20.881
11.801 29.671
12.001 31.87%
12.501 37.361
13.001 42.861
13.501 48.351
14.001 53.851
14.501 59.341
15.001 64.841
D- Impact of Change in MediaC- Impact of Change in Income on Affordability
if interest rates increase
MEDIAN Y I CHANGE
$10,000 -35.281 28
$12,000 -22.331 24
$14,000 -9.391 205
$15,450 0.001 181
$18,000 16.501 16(
$20,000 29.451 144
$22,000 42.391 131
$24,000 55.341 120
$26,000 68.28% 11
$28,000 81.231 102
$30,000 94.171 96
$32,300 109.061 8
$34,000 120.061 84
$36,000 133.011 8
$38,000 145.951 7
$40,000 158.90% 7
$42,000 171.841 6B
$44,000 184.791 6
$46,000 197.731 6
$48,000 210.681 6
$50,000 223.62X 5
if interest rates are
+$AFFAFF
8.241
0.201
5.881
6.56%
0.131
4.121
.021
0.101
0.861
2.941
.081
9.241
.781
0.071
5.851
2.061
8.631
5.511
2.661
0.051
7.651
$10,000
$12,000
$14,000
$15,450
$18,000
$20,000
$22,000
$24,000
$26,000
$28,000
$30,000
$32,300
$34,000
$36,000
$38,000
$40,000
$42,000
$44,000
$46,000
$48,000
$50,000
st
54.10X
56.401
58.76%
61.171
63.631
66.141
68.691
71.281
74.44%
76.58%
79.281
82.01X
84.771
89.241
90.371
93.201
96.051
98.93%
101.82X
104.72%
107.641
n Income
able
240.45%
200.381
171.75%
155.631
133.59%
120.231
109.301
100.191
92.481
85.881
80.151
74.44%
70.721
66.79%
63.28%
60.111
57.251
54.651
52.271
50.091
48.091
co
SENSITIVITY TABLES E & F
Sonsitivity Analysis for Median Income Model
E-Iapact of Change in Median Income on Resale Price and IRR
Yrly Change tRP
15450 0.001
22000 3.601
24000 4.501
28000 6.131
32300 7.651
34300 8.301
36300 8.92%
40000 9.981
45000 11.28%
$32,000$45,566$49,709$57,994$66,900$71,042
$75 184
$82 848
$93,204
+$IRR
-8.64!
11.74!
14.761
19.43!
23.251
24.76%
26.14!
28.421
31.071
F-lapact of Change in Interest Rate on Affordability
X CHANGE +AFF
5.001 -45.05%
5.501 -39.561
6.00! -34.071
6.501 -28.57!
7.001 -23.08!
7.501 -17.581
8.001 -12.09%
8.501 -6.591
9.10! 0.001
9.50! 4.40!
10.001 9.891
10.501 15.38!
11.001 20.88!
11.801 29.671
12.001 31.871
12.501 37.36!
13.00! 42.861
13.50! 48.351
14.001 53.85!
14.501 59.34!
15.00! 64.84!
O
58%
60!
631
65%
68%
71%
731
76!
80!
82!
85%
88%
91!
951
97%
100%
103!
106!
109%
112%
115%
SENSITIVITY TABLES 6 -1
Sensitivity Analysis for Burlington Model
6-Iapact of Change in Resale Price H-lpact of Change in Interest Rate on Affordability
I Change +$IRR +$AFF I CHANGE +AFF
44300 0.001 -8.641 45.01% 5.001 -45.051 38.29%
49300 11.291 -4.931 46.021 5.501 -39.561 39.931
54300 22.571 -2.02% 48.631 6.001 -34.07% 41.621
59300 33.06% 0.381 50.43% 6.50% -28.571 43.341
64300 45.15% 2.431 52.241 7.001 -23.08% 45.10%
69300 56.43% 4.22% 54.05% 7.501 -17.581 46.891
74300 67.721 5.82% 55.85% 8.001 -12.09% 48.711
79300 79.011 7.251 57.66% 8.501 -6.59% 50.56%
84300 90.29% 8.551 59.47% 9.10% 0.00% 52.82%
89300 101.58% 9.75% 61.27% 9.50% 4.40% 54.341
95133 114.75% 11.041 63.381 10.001 9.89% 56.27%
100133 126.03% 12.06% 65.191 10.501 15.38% 58.221
105133 137.32% 13.01% 67.00% 11.00% 20.88% 60.19%
110133 148.611 13.91% 68.80% 11.80% 29.671 63.38%
115133 159.89% 14.76% 70.611 12.001 31.87% 64.19%
120133 171.18% 15.56% 72.421 12.501 37.361 66.211
125133 182.471 16.321 74.221 13.001 42.861 68.25%
130133 193.75% 17.051 76.03X 13.50% 48.351 70.301
135133 205.04% 17.74% 77.84% 14.001 53.851 72.371
14.50% 59.341 74.44%
15.001 64.841 76.531
1-Impact of Change in Income on Affordability
% CHANBE +AFF
$10,000 -54.501 204.721
$12,000 -28.75% 170.601
$14,000 -10.36% 146.23%
$15,450 0.001 132.51%
$18,000 14.17% 113.74%
$20,000 22.75% 102.361
$22,000 29.77% 93.06%
$24,000 35.631 85.30%
$26,000 40.58% 78.741
$28,000 44.82% 73.121
$30,000 48.50% 68.241
$32,300 52.17% 63.381
$34,000 54.56% 60.21%
$36,000 57.08% 56.87%
$38,000 59.34% 53.871
$40,000 61.38% 51.18%
$42,000 63.21% 48.741
$44,000 64.891 46.531
$46,000 66.41% 44.511
$48,000 67.81% 42.65%
$50,000 69.101 40.94%
SENSITIVITY TABLES J & K
Sensitivity Analysis for Affordability Model
J-Impact of Change in Interest Rate on Resale Price, NPV and IRR K-Impact of Change in Income on Resale Price and IRR
+RP +SNPV +$IRR INCOME X CHANGE +RP +IRR
3.001 $106,000 $20,584 33.85! $22,000 3.601 $37,500 3.181
5.001 $90,000 $15,313 30.291 $24,000 4.501 $41,000 7.521
7.001 $76,000 $10,701 26.401 $28,000 6.131 $47,500 13.231
9.001 $66,000 $7,406 22.911 $32 300 7.651 $55 000 17.901
11.001 $58,000 $4 770 19.43% 134,300 8.30! $58,000 19.431
11.80! $55,000 $3,782 17.90! $36,300 8.921 $61,500 21.05%
13.001 $51,000 $2 464 15.58
15.00! $45,000 1652 11.69!
17.001 $41,000 ($831) 7.521
19.001 $37,500 ($1,984) 3.181
Co
0)
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